Concise UC Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Oblivious Updatable Databases by Camenisch, Jan et al.
Concise UC Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Oblivious
Updatable Databases
Jan Camenisch1, Maria Dubovitskaya1, and Alfredo Rial2
1 Dfinity
{jan,maria}@dfinity.org
2 SnT, University of Luxembourg
alfredo.rial@uni.lu
Abstract. We propose an ideal functionalityFCD and a construction for oblivious
and updatable committed databases.FCD allows a prover to read, write, and update
values in a database and to prove to a verifier in zero-knowledge that a value is
read from or written into a certain position. The following properties must hold:
(1) values stored in the database remain hidden from the verifier; (2) a value read
from a certain position is equal to the value previously written into that position;
(3) (obliviousness) both the value read or written and its position remain hidden
from the verifier.
We describe a construction for FCD based on vector commitments. After the
initialization phase, the cost of read and write operations is independent of the
database size, outperforming other techniques that achieve cost sublinear in the
dataset size for prover and/or verifier. Therefore, our construction is especially
appealing for large datasets.
In existing “commit-and-prove” two-party protocols, the task of maintaining a
committed database between prover and verifier and reading and writing values
into it is not separated from the task of proving statements about the values read
or written. FCD allows us to improve modularity in protocol design by separating
those tasks. In comparison to simply using a commitment scheme to maintain a
committed database, FCD allows the prover to hide efficiently the positions read
or written from the verifier. Thanks to this property, we design efficient OR proofs
and protocols for privacy-preserving e-commerce and location-based services
where verifiers can gather aggregate statistics about provers.
1 Introduction
Many cryptographic protocols use a commit-and-prove methodology [12]. Typically, the
prover commits to her input and then proves in zero-knowledge statements about the
committed values. These steps are often repeated and intertwined, i.e., commitments are
updated, new ones formed, and additional proofs executed.
We can regard commitments as a tool used to maintain a database of values between
prover and verifier. When the prover commits to a value, the value is written into the
database. When the prover proves a statement about a value committed previously, the
prover reads a value from the database. Commitments guarantee the following properties:
(1) values stored in the database are hidden from the verifier (hiding property); (2) once
a value is written into the database at a certain position (i.e, commitment), the prover
cannot read a different value (binding property); (3) zero-knowledge proofs for reading
or writing a value ensure that the value remains hidden from the verifier.
The use of commitments to maintain a database between prover and verifier is not
adequate for certain applications. For example, consider a prover that holds a large
dataset of values and writes the dataset into the database (i.e. commits to the dataset). At
some point, the prover needs to prove that there exists a value in the dataset that fulfills a
statement, without revealing which value it is. Such proof needs to hide from the verifier
both the value read from the database and the position where the value is stored.
Unfortunately, when commitments are used to maintain the database, the cost of a
zero-knowledge proof that meets those properties grows linearly with the database size.
We would like that this cost be independent of the database size.
On the other hand, in most commit-and-prove protocols, the task of maintaining
a database between prover and verifier and reading and writing values into it is not
separated from the task of proving statements about the values read or written. I.e.,
typically the prover computes a zero-knowledge proof to prove a statement about a
committed value. Such a proof involves both reading a value from the database and
proving a statement about it.
We propose to separate the task of maintaining a database between prover and verifier
from the task of proving statements about the values read or written or about the positions
where the values are stored. This will improve the modularity in protocol design and will
lead to simpler and more structured security proofs that are easier to verify. Additionally,
it will enable the study of the task of maintaining a database between prover and verifier
in isolation, which allows an easy comparison of different techniques to maintain a
database.
1.1 Our Contribution
UC functionality FCD. In Section 3, we define an ideal functionality FCD for an
oblivious and updatable committed database (CD) in the UC framework. The database
consists of a table Tblcd with Nmax entries of the form [i, v], where i is a position in
[1,Nmax ] and v is the value stored at that position. FCD ensures the following:
1. The values in the database remain hidden from the verifier V .
2. V is guaranteed that a value read from Tblcd at position i is equal to the value
previously written into i.
3. (Obliviousness) In read and write operations, both the value and the position read or
written remain hidden from V .
The database is updatable because FCD allows the prover P to overwrite values into the
database at any time.
FCD allows P to read and write values into the database. To prove statements about
a value, or about the position where the value is read or written, P must use an ideal
functionality FRZK for zero-knowledge parameterized by the appropriate statement R.
This effectively separates the task of maintaining a database from the task of proving
statements about the positions and values read or written. Consequently, we are able to
design constructions for the committed database task in isolation and to compare them.
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In a hybrid protocol that uses FCD and FRZK as building blocks, we need to guarantee
that the value and the position read or written into FCD are equal to the value and
position sent to FRZK. For this purpose, we use a method proposed in [6], which consists
in sending committed inputs to FCD and FRZK (see Section 2).
Construction ΠCD. In Section 5, we provide an efficient construction ΠCD for FCD
that uses vector commitments (VC) [34, 14], which are suitable to implement a database
Tblcd that consists of a one-dimensional array. A VC is a type of commitment that
allows committing to a vector of values. The committer can open single positions of
the committed vector to the verifier with communication cost constant and independent
of the vector size. Vector commitments can also be updated. The computation cost of
updating a commitment com or a witness w to open a position grows linearly only with
the number of updates and does not depend on the size of the committed vector.
ΠCD works as follows. At setup, P and V map the initial values of Tblcd to a vector
of length Nmax and compute a vector commitment com to that vector. When P wants to
read the value v at position i, P computes a VC witness w for position i and proves in
zero-knowledge that v is committed at position i. To write a value v at a position i into
the database, P updates com to com ′. com ′ commits to the same vector as com , except
that v is now at position i. Then P sends com ′ to V and proves in zero-knowledge that
com ′ is an update of com .
The communication cost of read and write operations is independent of the vector
length Nmax . The cost of computing com and w grows linearly with Nmax . However,
we note that com and w only need to be computed once. After that, they can be reused
for multiple read operations and, when the database is updated, com and w can be
updated with cost that grows with the number of updates, but that is independent of
Nmax . Therefore ΠCD is suitable for large databases. In Section 7, we show that our
construction improves in terms of efficiency over the existing ZK protocols for proving
statements that involve large witnesses, such as ZK proofs for relations described as
ORAM programs [38, 26]. In Section F, we propose an efficient instantiation of ΠCD
that uses a VC scheme secure under the DHE assumption.
Modular design and applications of FCD. In Section 6, we describe how to design a
hybrid protocol that uses FCD and FRZK following the method in [6]. FCD is particularly
useful for protocols where P needs to hide from V the positions read or written into the
database. (Otherwise, a simple commitment scheme could be used to store the database.)
We describe some applications where this is the case. First, we describe how to use our
committed database to compute OR proofs with amortized constant cost independent of
the size of the witness. Second, we show how FCD can be used to design protocols for
privacy-preserving e-commerce and location-based services where service providers can
gather aggregate statistics about users. In those protocols, FCD is used to store counters
on the number of times a user buys a type of item or checks-in at a certain location. When
a user purchases an item or checks-in at a location, the user computes a zero-knowledge
proof that uses the item or the location as witness. Then the corresponding counter in
FCD is incremented. At a later stage, the user can reads counters from FCD to prove
that they satisfy a statistic of interest to the service provider. We formalize this use of
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FCD as “zero-knowledge counting”, i.e., counting the number of times a witness value
is used by a prover in different ZK proofs.
2 Modular Design and Ideal Functionality FNIC
We summarize the UC framework and explain the notation used to describe ideal
functionalities in Section A. In the UC framework, protocols can be described modularly
by using a hybrid model where parties invoke the ideal functionalities of the building
blocks of a protocol. For example, consider a protocol that uses as building blocks a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and a signature scheme. In a modular description of
this protocol in the hybrid model, parties in the real world invoke the ideal functionalities
for zero-knowledge proofs and for signatures.
One challenge when describing a UC protocol in the hybrid model is to ensure, when
needed, that two or more ideal functionalities receive the same input. To address this
issue, we use the method proposed in [6]. In [6], a functionality FNIC for non-interactive
commitments is proposed. FNIC interacts with parties Pi and consists of four interfaces
com.setup, com.validate, com.commit and com.verify:
1. Any party Pi uses the com.setup interface to set up the functionality.
2. Any party Pi uses the com.commit interface to send a message cm and obtain a
commitment ccom and an opening copen . A commitment ccom consists of (ccom ′,
cparcom,COM.Verify), where ccom ′ is the commitment, cparcom are the public
parameters, and COM.Verify is the verification algorithm.
3. Any party Pi uses the com.validate interface to send a commitment ccom in order
to check that ccom contains the correct public parameters and verification algorithm.
4. Any party Pi uses the com.verify interface to send (ccom, cm, copen) in order to
verify that ccom is a commitment to the message cm with the opening copen .
FNIC can be realized by a perfectly hiding commitment scheme, such as Pedersen
commitments [6]. In [6], a method is described to use FNIC in order to ensure that a
party sends the same input cm to several ideal functionalities. For this purpose, the
party first uses com.commit to get a commitment ccom to cm with opening copen.
Then the party sends (ccom, cm, copen) as input to each of the functionalities, and
each functionality runs COM.Verify to verify the commitment. Finally, other parties
in the protocol receive the commitment ccom from each of the functionalities and
use the com.validate interface to validate ccom . Then, if ccom received from all the
functionalities is the same, the binding property provided by FNIC ensures that all the
functionalities received the same input cm . When using FNIC, it is needed to work in the
FNIC||SNIC-hybrid model, where SNIC is any simulator for a construction that realizes
FNIC. Our functionality FCD receives committed inputs as described in [6]. We depict
FNIC in Section C.4.
3 Ideal Functionality FCD for a Committed Database
Intuition. Our functionality FCD interacts with a prover P and a verifier V and has three
interfaces: “setup”, “read” and “write”. FCD maintains a committed database where
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every entry is stored as a tuple [position, value]. The “setup” interface initializes the
database to values known to both P and V . The “write” interface allows P to update an
entry of the committed database. V learns neither the position nor the value of the entry
being written. The “read” interface allows P to prove to V knowledge of an entry in the
database without revealing neither its position nor the value to V . To ensure that both the
prover and the verifier use the same version of the database, FCD maintains counters
for the number of writing operations sent by P and the number of writing operations
received by V . The counters are checked for consistency for both read and write queries.
Both “read” and “write” interfaces require commitments to the position and to the
value to be provided as input. This allows FCD to be used in conjunction with other
functionalities (e.g. FRZK for zero-knowledge proofs) in a modular way to build high-
level protocols. That is, once the prover proves to the verifier that the commitment values
commit to a database entry by using FCD, those commitments can be used as input to
other functionalities of the high-level (hybrid) protocol. For example, the commitment to
the position and to the value can be input to FRZK to prove in zero-knowledge statements
about the position and the value read from or written into the database. This allows us to
prove different statements about the values from the database without revealing neither
the value itself nor its position to the verifier. The binding property guaranteed by FNIC
ensures that the committed values given as input to FCD and to FRZK are equal.
Notation. FCD is parameterized by a universe of state values Uv and by a state size
Nmax . FCD maintains a table Tblcd that stores the database. Tblcd contains Nmax entries
of the form [i , v ], where i ∈ [1,Nmax ] is the position in the table and v ∈ Uv is the
value stored at that position. FCD maintains a counter cp for the number of writing
operations sent by P and a counter cv for the number of writing operations received
by V . The interaction between the functionality FCD, P and V takes place through the
following interfaces:
– V uses the cd.setup interface to initialize Tblcd. FCD stores Tblcd and sends Tblcd
to P and to the simulator S.
– P uses cd.read to send a position i and a value vr to FCD, along with commitments
and openings (ccomi , copeni) and (ccomr , copenr ) to the position and value re-
spectively. FCD verifies the commitments and checks that there is an entry [i, vr ] in
the table Tblcd. In that case, FCD sends ccomi and ccomr to V . S also learns ccomi
and ccomr .
– P uses cd.write to send a position i and a value vw to FCD, along with commitments
and openings (ccomi , copeni) and (ccomw , copenw ) to the position and value re-
spectively. FCD verifies the commitments and then updates Tblcd to store vw at
position i. FCD sends ccomi and ccomw to V . S also learns ccomi and ccomw .
The commitment parameters cparcom and the commitment verification algorithm
COM.Verify are included in the commitment values (as in functionality FNIC).
We describe FCD below. We consider static corruptions. In this description, we list
all the abortion conditions and describe how FCD saves its state before querying the
simulator S and recovers it after receiving a response from S. These steps are often
omitted in the description of ideal functionalities. In the “read” and “write” interfaces,
FCD creates a query identifier qid to link the replies from S to the corresponding query
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to S. In the “setup” interface, this is not needed because that interface can only be
invoked once.
Description of FCD. Functionality FCD is parameterized by a universe of values Uv
and by a maximum table size Nmax . FCD interacts with a prover P and a verifier V .
1. On input (cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblcd) from V:
– Abort if sid /∈ (P,V, sid ′) or if (sid ,Tblcd) is already stored.
– Abort if Tblcd does not consist of entries of the form [i, v], or if the number of
entries in Tblcd is not Nmax .
– Abort if for i = 1 to Nmax , v /∈ Uv for any entry [i, v] in Tblcd.
– Initialize a counter cv ← 0 for the verifier and store (sid , cv) and (sid ,Tblcd).
– Send (cd.setup.sim, sid ,Tblcd) to S.
S. On input (cd.setup.rep, sid) from S:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblcd) is not stored, or if (sid ,Tblcd, cp) is already stored.
– Initialize a counter cp ← 0 for the prover and store (sid ,Tblcd, cp).
– Send (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tblcd) to P .
2. On input (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomi , i, copeni , ccomr , vr , copenr ) from P:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblcd, cp) is not stored.
– Abort if i /∈ [1,Nmax ], or if vr /∈ Uv , or if [i, vr ] is not stored in Tblcd.
– Parse the commitment ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi ,COM.Verifyi).
– Parse the commitment ccomr as (ccom ′r, cparcomr ,COM.Verifyr).
– Abort if COM.Verifyi or COM.Verifyr are not ppt algorithms.
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi , ccomi , i, copeni).
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verifyr(cparcomr , ccomr , vr , copenr ).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ccomi , ccomr , cp).
– Send (cd.read.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomr ) to S.
S. On input (cd.read.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ccomi , ccomr , cp′) is not stored.
– Abort if cp′ 6= cv , where cv is stored in (sid , cv).
– Delete the record (qid , ccomi , ccomr , cp′).
– Send (cd.read.end, sid , ccomi , ccomr ) to V .
3. On input (cd.write.ini, sid , ccomi , i, copeni , ccomw , vw , copenw ) from P:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblcd, cp) is not stored.
– Abort if i /∈ [1,Nmax ], or if vw /∈ Uv .
– Parse the commitment ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi ,COM.Verifyi).
– Parse the commitment ccomw as (ccom ′w, cparcomw ,COM.Verifyw).
– Abort if COM.Verifyi or COM.Verifyw are not ppt algorithms.
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi , ccomi , i, copeni).
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verifyw(cparcomw , ccomw , vw , copenw ).
– Increment the counter cp in (sid ,Tblcd, cp) and store [i, vw ] in Tblcd.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ccomi , ccomw , cp).
– Send (cd.write.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomw ) to S.
S. On input (cd.write.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ccomi , ccomw , cp′) is not stored.
– Abort if cp′ 6= cv + 1, where cv is stored in (sid , cv).
– Increment the counter cv in (sid , cv).
– Delete the record (qid , ccomi , ccomw , cp′).
– Send (cd.write.end, sid , ccomi , ccomw ) to V .
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Discussion of FCD. The restriction that the identities P and V must be included in the
session identifier sid = (P,V, sid ′) guarantees that every verifier can create an instance
of FCD with every prover. We note that it is easy to modify FCD and our construction
for FCD so that the setup phase is started by P .
In the “read” interface, FCD aborts if [i , vr ] received as input are not stored in Tblcd.
This guarantees to V that the position and the value committed to in ccomi and in ccomr
respectively correspond to an entry in Tblcd. After being triggered by S, FCD aborts if
the query identifier is not stored, or if the number of writing operations received by V
does not equal the number of writing operations sent by P when the read operation was
started. This guarantees that the table used by P when computing the read operation
equals the table used by V to verify the read operation. A similar check is performed by
FCD in the “write” interface.
FCD sends commitments to the position and to the value to V . To hide the position
and the value from V , the hiding property of the commitment is required to hold. This is
achieved by using FNIC to compute commitments.
4 Building Blocks
Ideal Functionality FCRS.SetupCRS . Our protocol uses the functionality FCRS.SetupCRS for com-
mon reference string generation in [11]. FCRS.SetupCRS interacts with any parties P that
obtain the common reference string, and consists of one interface crs.get. A party
P uses the crs.get interface to request and receive the common reference string crs
from FCRS.SetupCRS . In the first invocation, FCRS.SetupCRS generates crs by running algorithm
CRS.Setup. The simulator S also receives crs . We depict FCRS.SetupCRS in Section C.1.
Ideal Functionality FAUT. Our protocol uses the functionality FAUT for an authenti-
cated channel in [11]. FAUT interacts with a sender T and a receiver R, and consists
of one interface aut.send. T uses the aut.send interface to send a message m to FAUT.
FAUT leaks m to the simulator S and, after receiving a response from S, FAUT sends
m toR. S cannot modify m . The session identifier sid contains the identities of T and
R. We depict FAUT in Section C.2.
Ideal Functionality FRZK. Let R be a polynomial time computable binary relation. For
tuples (wit , ins) ∈ R we call wit the witness and ins the instance. Our protocol uses
the ideal functionality FRZK for zero-knowledge in [11]. FRZK is parameterized by a
description of a relation R, runs with a prover P and a verifier V , and consists of one
interface zk.prove. P uses zk.prove to send a witness wit and an instance ins to FRZK.
FRZK checks whether (wit , ins) ∈ R, and, in that case, sends the instance ins to V . The
simulator S learns ins but not wit . We depict FRZK in Section C.3.
Vector Commitments. Vector commitments [34, 14] allow us to commit to a vector of
messages and to open the commitment to one of the messages in such a way that the
size of the witness is independent of the length of the vector. A vector commitment (VC)
scheme consists of the following algorithms.
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VC.Setup(1k, `). On input the security parameter 1k and an upper bound ` on the size
of the vector, generate the parameters of the commitment scheme par , which include
a description of the message spaceM and a description of the randomness spaceR.
VC.Commit(par ,x, r). On input a vector x ∈ Mn (n ≤ `) and r ∈ R, output a
commitment com to x.
VC.Wit(par , i,x, r). Compute a witness w for x[i].
VC.Verify(par , com, x, i,w). Output 1 if w is a valid witness for x being at position i
and 0 otherwise.
VC.ComUpd(par , com, j, x, r, x′, r′). On input a commitment com with value x at
position j and randomness r, output a commitment com ′ with value x′ at position j
and randomness r′. The other positions remain unchanged.
VC.VerComUpd(par , com, com ′,w , j, x, r, x′, r′). On input commitments com and
com ′, a witness w , a position j, the values x and x′ and the randomness r and r′,
output 1 if w is a valid witness for x being at position j in the commitment com and
if com ′ is an update of com that replaces x by x′ at position j and r by r′.
VC.WitUpd(par ,w , i, j, x, r, x′, r′). On input a witness w for a position i valid for a
commitment com with value x at position j and randomness r, output a witness
w ′ for position i valid for a commitment com ′ with value x′ at position j and
randomness r′.
A VC scheme must be correct, hiding, and binding, as defined in Section B.
5 ConstructionΠCD for a Committed Database
Our construction ΠCD uses a vector commitment (VC) scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit,
VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd, VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd). A vector commit-
ment com is used to store the table Tblcd. A position in the vector commitment acts as a
position in Tblcd, and the value committed to in that position acts as the value stored in
Tblcd in that position.
In the setup interface, P and V obtain the VC parameters par from the functionality
FCRS.SetupCRS for common reference string, which is parameterized by the setup algorithm
VC.Setup = CRS.Setup of the VC scheme. V receives as input a table Tblcd an computes
a commitment com to Tblcd with 0 randomness. V sends Tblcd to P by using the ideal
functionality FAUT for an authenticated channel, and P also computes a commitment
com to Tblcd with 0 randomness.
In the read interface, P receives as input a position i and a value vr , along with
commitments and openings (ccomi , copeni) and (ccomr , copenr ). P uses the ideal
functionality FRrZK for zero-knowledge proofs to prove to V that ccomi and ccomr
commit to i and vr such that vr is the message committed at position i in the commitment
com . This proves that [i, vr ] ∈ Tblcd.
In the write interface, P receives as input a position i and a value vw , along with
commitments and openings (ccomi , copeni) and (ccomw , copenw ). P updates the com-
mitment com to a commitment com ′ that commits to vw at position i, while other
positions remain unchanged. P uses the functionality FRwZK to prove to V that ccomi and
ccomw commit to i and vw , and that com ′ is an update of com where vw is committed
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in the position i. We note that com ′ contains randomness chosen by P and thus, after
the first execution of the write interface, the committed table will be hidden from V .
We describe ΠCD. For brevity, we omit some abortion conditions or the messages
sent to the functionalities used as building blocks. The full description is in Section D.
Description of ΠCD. ΠCD uses a vector commitment scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit,
VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd, VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd) and the ideal func-
tionalities FVC.SetupCRS , FAUT, FRrZK and FRwZK . The table size Nmax is the maximum length
of a committed vector, and the universe of values Uv is given by the message space of
the VC scheme.
1. On input (cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblcd), V and P do the following:
– V uses the crs.get interface of FVC.SetupCRS to obtain the VC parameters par .
– V initializes a counter cv ← 0 that counts the write operations received.
– V stores Tblcd in a vector x: for i = 1 to Nmax , x[i] = v, where [i, v] ∈ Tblcd.
– V commits to x: set r ← 0 and run com ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r).
– V stores (sid , cv , par , com).
– V uses the aut.send interface of FAUT to send Tblcd to P .
– P follows the same steps as V to get par , set x and compute com .
– P initializes a counter cp ← 0 that counts write operations started.
– P stores (sid , cp, par , com,x, r).
– P outputs (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tblcd).
2. On input (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomi, i , copeni, ccomr, vr, copenr), P and V do:
– P parses ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi).
– P parses ccomr as (ccom ′r, cparcomr,COM.Verifyr).
– P takes the stored tuple (sid , cp, par , com,x, r).
– If (sid , i ,w) is not stored, P computes a VC witness w for position i : run
w ← VC.Wit(par , i ,x, r) and store (sid , i ,w).
– P sets witr ← (w , i , copeni, vr, copenr).
– P sets insr ← (par , com, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomr, ccom ′r, cp).
– P uses the zk.prove interface to send witr and insr to FRrZK, where Rr is
Rr ={(witr, insr) :
1 = COM.Verifyi(cparcomi, ccom
′
i, i , copeni) ∧ (1)
1 = COM.Verifyr(cparcomr, ccom
′
r, vr, copenr) ∧ (2)
1 = VC.Verify(par , com, vr, i ,w)} (3)
In equation 1, P proves that ccomi is a commitment to i with opening copeni.
Similarly, in equation 2, P proves that ccomr is a commitment to vr with
opening copenr. In equation 3, P proves that vr is stored in the position i of
the vector commitment com .
– V receives insr = (par ′, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomr, ccom ′r, cp).
– V takes the stored tuple (sid , cv , par , com).
– V aborts if cp 6= cv , or if par ′ 6= par , or if com ′ 6= com .
– V sets ccomi ← (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi).
– V sets ccomr ← (ccom ′r, cparcomr,COM.Verifyr).
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– V outputs (cd.read.end, sid , ccomi, ccomr).
3. On input (cd.write.ini, sid , ccomi, i , copeni, ccomw, vw, copenw), P and V do:
– P takes the stored tuple (sid , cp, par , com,x, r).
– P parses ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi).
– P parses ccomw as (ccom ′w, cparcomw,COM.Verifyw).
– If (sid , i ,w) is not stored, P computes a VC witness w for position i : run
w ← VC.Wit(par , i ,x, r) and store (sid , i ,w).
– P updates the vector commitment com to com ′: pick random r′ ← R and run
com ′ ← VC.ComUpd(par , com, i , vr, r, vw, r′), where vr ← x[i ].
– P increments the counter of write operations started cp′ ← cp + 1.
– P sets witw ← (w , i , copeni, vr, vw, copenw, r, r′).
– P sets insw ← (par , com, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomw, ccom ′w, cp′).
– P updates the vector x to x′: set x′ ← x and x′[i ]← vw.
– P updates the stored tuple to (sid , cp′, par , com ′,x′, r′).
– P updates the stored witnesses: for j = 1 to Nmax , if (sid , j,w) is stored, run
w ′ ← VC.WitUpd(par ,w , j, i , x, r, x′, r′) and update to (sid , j,w ′).
– P uses the zk.prove interface to send witw and insw to FRwZK , where Rw is
Rw ={(witw, insw) :
1 = COM.Verifyi(cparcomi, ccomi, i , copeni) ∧ (4)
1 = COM.Verifyw(cparcomw, ccomw, vw, copenw) ∧ (5)
1 = VC.VerComUpd(par , com, com ′,w , i , vr, r, vw, r′)} (6)
In equation 4 and equation 5, the prover proves that ccomi and ccomw are
commitments to i and vw respectively. In equation 6, the prover proves that vr
is stored in the position i in the vector commitment com , and that com ′ is a
vector commitment that stores the same values as com , except that it stores vw
in the position i and that its random value is r′ instead of r.
– V gets insw = ( ˆpar , ˆcom, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomw, ccom ′w, cp).
– V takes the stored tuple (sid , cv , par , com).
– V parses insw as ( ˆpar , ˆcom, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomw, ccom ′w, cp).
– V aborts if cp 6= cv + 1, or if ˆpar 6= par , or if ˆcom 6= com .
– V sets cv ′ ← cv + 1 and updates the stored tuple to (sid , cv ′, par , com ′).
– V sets ccomi ← (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi).
– V sets ccomw ← (ccom ′w, cparcomw,COM.Verifyw).
– V outputs (cd.write.end, sid , ccomi, ccomw).
Theorem 1. ΠCD securely realizesFCD in theFVC.SetupCRS ,FAUT,FRrZK andFRwZK -hybrid
model if the VC scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit, VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd,
VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd) is hiding and binding as defined in Section B.
When P is corrupt, the binding property of the vector commitment scheme guarantees
that the adversary is not able to open the vector commitment to a position and a value if
that value was not previously committed at that position. When V is corrupt, the hiding
property of the VC scheme guarantees that the committed vector remains hidden from V .
We analyze in detail the security of ΠCD in Section E.
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In Section F, we propose an instantiation of ΠCD and analyze its efficiency. The
instantiation is based on a VC scheme secure under the DHE assumption. Our efficiency
analysis shows that, after initialization, computation and communication costs do not
depend on the database size, which makes our construction appealing for large databases.
Our concrete efficiency analysis shows that the instantiation is practical.
Storage Cost. For P , the cost grows linearly with the database size. For V , it is constant
because in practice V does not need to store the whole VC parameters par .
Communication Cost. At setup, the cost grows linearly with the database size when V
sends Tblcd to P , although we note that in practice this can be avoided if Tblcd is
initialized to default values known by P and V . In the read and write operations, the
cost is constant and independent of the database size.
Computation cost. The first time com and a witness w are computed, the cost grows
linearly with the database size. However, after that, if the database is not updated,
the cost of read and write operations is independent of the database size. If it is
updated, com and w are updated with cost that grows with the number of write
operations, but is independent of the database size.
6 Modular Design with FCD and Applications
First, we describe how FCD is used as building block together with FNIC and FRZK to
describe a hybrid protocol. Consider as a simple example a protocol where the prover P
writes a value v at position i into the database and later on proves statements about i and
v to the verifier V . P needs to hide i and v from V when v is written into and when it is
read from the database. On a high level, the construction works as follows:
1. V runs the com.setup interface of FNIC.
2. V uses the cd.setup interface of FCD to initialize Tblcd, which is sent to P .
3. P runs the com.setup interface of FNIC.
4. P uses the com.commit interface of FNIC twice to get commitments and openings
(ccomi , copeni) and (ccomw , copenw ) to the position i and to the value v.
5. P uses the cd.write interface of FCD on input the tuple (ccomi, i , copeni, ccomw,
v, copenw) to write the entry [i, v] into Tblcd. V receives (ccomi, ccomw). Thanks
to the hiding property of the commitments computed by FNIC, V is oblivious to the
position and the value being written.
6. V uses the com.validate interface of FNIC twice to validate that ccomi and ccomw
contain the parameters and verification algorithm used by FNIC.
7. When P wants to prove a statement about i and v, P uses the com.commit interface
ofFNIC twice to get fresh commitments and openings (ccomi ′, copen ′i) and (ccomr ,
copenr ) to i and v.
8. P uses the cd.read interface of FCD on input (ccom ′i, i, copen ′i, ccomr, v, copenr)
to read the entry [i, v] in Tblcd. V receives (ccom ′i, ccomr). Thanks to the hiding
property of the commitments computed by FNIC, the verifier is oblivious to the
position and the value being read.
9. V uses the com.validate interface of FNIC twice to validate that ccom ′i and ccomr
contain the parameters and verification algorithm used by FNIC.
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10. P uses the zk.prove interface of FRZK to prove statements about i and v. P sends
an instance and a witness such that ccom ′i and ccomr are in the instance, whereas
(i, copen ′i) and (v, copenr) are in the witness. V receives the instance and checks
that (ccom ′i, ccomr) in the instance are equal to those received from FCD. Then the
binding property of the commitments computed by FNIC guarantees that the same
position i and value v that were input to FCD are now input to FRZK.
This protocol hides from V that the commitments (ccomi, ccomw) written into the
database and the commitments (ccom ′i, ccomr) read from the database commit to the
same entry [i, v]. If this property is not needed, a simple protocol where P sends to V
commitments to i and v and later on uses FRZK to prove statements about i and v can
be used. Therefore, FCD is particularly useful as building block of protocols where P
needs to hide from V the positions read or written. We identify some applications where
this property is needed.
OR proofs. In Section G, we describe in detail how FCD can be used to efficiently
compute ZK proofs for OR relations, i.e., relations where P proves that at least one value
in a list of values fulfills a statement, while hiding from V which of the values fulfills
it. In a nutshell, P writes the list of values for the OR relation into Tblcd. After that, P
simply reads one of the values from Tblcd and uses FRZK to prove in zero-knowledge
that this value fulfills the statement. By using the protocol described above, V does not
learn what value is read from Tblcd and cannot link the value read to the moment when
it was written into Tblcd. Our protocol for OR proofs is practical. After an initialization
where the list of values are written into Tblcd, multiple OR proofs can be computed with
cost independent of the size of the list. Our protocol has amortized constant cost, while
the cost of other existing proofs for OR relations grows with the list size.
Zero-Knowledge counting. In Section H, we describe the use of FCD in protocols for
privacy-preserving e-commerce. In privacy-preserving e-commerce, users buy digital
items without revealing the item to the service provider. FCD allows the service provider
to gather aggregate statistics about users. To gather aggregate statistics, the table Tblcd
is used to store counters on the number of times a user buys a type of item. I.e. each
position in Tblcd stores the counter for a type of item. When a user buys an item of a
certain type, the counter for that type of item is read from Tblcd, incremented and written
into Tblcd. When the service provider wants an aggregate statistic about the purchases
made, the user reads counters from Tblcd and proves in zero-knowledge a statistic about
them. We note that, to protect user privacy, the service provider must not be able to know
what counter is incremented during a purchase, or to link a counter read to compute
a statistic to the moments when that counter was incremented. FCD allow us to fulfill
those privacy properties.
FCD can be similarly applied to gather aggregate statistics in privacy-preserving
location-based services. We formalize this use of FCD as “zero-knowledge counting”,
i.e., counting the number of times a witness is used by a prover in different ZK proofs.
We define and describe in detail a protocol for “zero-knowledge counting” in Section H.
12
7 Related Work
There are a number of cryptographic primitives that allow us to represent a number of
values in a much smaller cryptographic artifact and later prove knowledge of a number
represented in the artifact. We summarize these primitives and compare them to our
solution. In Section I, we give a more detailed review of those primitives.
Commitments and ZK proofs of shuffles. Many protocols (e.g. [12, 9, 43]) use commit-
ment schemes to maintain a database between a prover P and a verifier V . However,
commitments on their own are not adequate to realize FCD because they do not allow P
to hide the positions read from or written into the database. ZK proofs of shuffles [17]
can be used to shuffle the commitments in order to hide the positions read or written. A
construction using commitments along with proofs of shuffles could realize FCD, but
less efficiently than a construction based on vector commitments.
Accumulators. A cryptographic accumulator [3] allows one to represent a set X suc-
cinctly as a single accumulator value A. It also provides a method to prove succinctly
that an element x belongs to X to any party that holds A. This method consists in
computing a witness W whose size is independent of the size |X| of the set. Soundness
(or collision-freeness) guarantees that it is infeasible to prove that x ∈ X if x /∈ X .
The main difference between vector commitments and accumulators is that, while accu-
mulators allow for committing to a set, vector commitments allow for committing to a
vector of messages, where each message is committed at a specific position. This allows
the construction of an updatable committed database where it is also possible to prove
statements about the position where a message is written or read.
Vector Commitments. In [14], a definition of non-hiding vector commitments with
updates is given. To obtain hiding vector commitments, it is suggested to compose
a non-hiding vector commitment scheme with a standard commitment scheme. Two
constructions of non-hiding vector commitments are given based on the CDH and RSA
assumptions. In [34], a construction of mercurial vector commitments based on the
Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) assumption is proposed. This construction leads to
constructions of non-hiding and hiding vector commitments based on DHE, which were
used in, e.g., [32, 27, 30].
Our committed database uses as building block any hiding vector commitment
scheme with updates, along with zero-knowledge proofs that a vector component is
being read or written. To instantiate our committed database, we use a construction of
hiding vector commitments with updates based on the DHE assumption along with the
corresponding zero-knowledge proofs for reading and writing. In this construction, the
size of the public parameters is linear in the maximum vector length. In comparison, in a
hiding VC construction from CDH, the size of the public parameters would be quadratic
(the advantage would be to use a more standard assumption).
Polynomial and functional commitments. Polynomial commitments allow a committer
to commit to a polynomial and open the commitment to an evaluation of the polynomial.
They can be used as vector commitments by committing to a polynomial that interpolates
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the vector to be committed. In [28], a construction of polynomial commitments from the
SDH assumption is proposed, which has the disadvantage that efficient updates cannot
be computed without knowledge of the trapdoor. A further generalization of vector
commitments and polynomial commitments are functional commitments [33].
Zero-Knowledge Data Structures. Zero-Knowledge Sets (ZKS) [37] allow a prover P
to commit to a set X and to subsequently prove to a verifier V (non-)membership of
an element x in X . Zero-Knowledge Databases (ZKDB) are similar to ZKS but each
element x ∈ X is associated with a value v, in such a way that a proof that x ∈ X
reveals v to V . Both ZKS and ZKDB are two-party protocols between P and V . Security
for V requires that an adversarial P is not able to prove x ∈ X if x /∈ X (and vice versa),
while zero-knowledge requires that proofs of (non-)membership reveal nothing else
beyond (non-)membership, not even the size of the set. In [23], a construction for zero-
knowledge lists (ZKL) is proposed, where a list is defined as an ordered set. Updatable
ZKDB were first proposed in [36]. In [14], a construction for updatable ZKDB based on
updatable vector commitments and trapdoor mercurial commitments is proposed.
There are several differences between our committed database and previous work.
First, our committed database is updatable, which was only considered in [36, 14].
Second, our committed database is oblivious. P proves in zero-knowledge that a pair of
commitments commit to a position and value that are stored in the database. In contrast,
in previous constructions, P reveals a position and a value along with a proof that the
position and the value are stored in the database. The obliviousness property allows
our committed database to be used as building block in applications that protect the
privacy of the P , because P could choose to open the commitments, but could also prove
statements in zero-knowledge about the committed position and value without revealing
them.
From a definitional point of view, security definitions given in previous works are
not in the UC model and a mechanism to integrate modularly ZKS or ZKDB as building
blocks of other protocols is not given. Our functionality for a committed database allows
the security analysis of ZK data structures in a composable framework, which will
facilitate the modular design and analysis of protocols that use them as a building block.
Another key difference is that we do not require the size of the database to be
hidden. Thanks to that, our construction for a committed database is more efficient than
existing constructions for ZKS or ZKDB. This relaxation of the ZK property is not
relevant for our applications for a committed database. In this respect, our construction
for a committed database is similar to the constructions for “nearly” ZKS and ZKDB
given in [28]. However, this “nearly” ZKS and ZKDB constructions based on the SDH
assumption are not updatable and, moreover, extending them with efficient updates is not
possible (see discussion on the paragraph about polynomial commitments). In fact, as
pointed out in [18], when hiding the size of the database is required, for any construction
that uses a non-interactive commitment phase (as is the case in the ZKS and ZKDB
constructions cited above), black-box extraction of the database by the simulator in the
security proof is not possible. In [18], a secure committed database where the database
size is hidden is defined in the UC model, and a construction that uses an interactive
commitment phase is proposed. As a consequence of needing to hide the database size,
the construction in [18] is also less efficient than ours. Also, their ideal functionality does
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not facilitate modular design, and it outputs position-value pairs instead of commitments
to a position and to a value, which hinders its use as building block in protocols that
need to protect the privacy of the prover.
ZK proofs for large datasets. In most ZK proofs, the computation and communication
cost grow linearly with the size of the witness, which is inadequate for proofs about
datasets M of large size |M |. However, there are techniques that attain costs sublinear
in |M |. Probabilistically checkable proofs [29] achieve verification cost sublinear in
|M |, but the cost for the prover is linear in |M |. In succinct non-interactive arguments of
knowledge [20], verification cost is independent of |M |, but the cost for the prover is
still linear in |M |.
ZK proofs for relations described as ORAM programs [38, 26] involve an initializa-
tion phase in which the prover commits to M . In [38], the cost for the prover is linear
in |M |, whereas the cost for the verifier is independent of |M |. After the initialization
phase, many proofs can be computed about M whose cost is sublinear (proportional to
the runtime of the ORAM program) both for the prover and for the verifier. The protocol
in [38] uses a non-programmable random oracle, which is key for achieving constant
cost for the verifier in the initialization phase. Any protocol in the standard model would
involve communication cost linear in M to allow knowledge extraction.
To compare our protocol with [38], we consider that the prover first writes M into
Tblcd, and after that reads values in M from Tblcd. The cost of writing M into Tblcd
is linear in |M | for both prover and verifier. However, after that the cost of each read
operation is independent of |M | for both prover and verifier. Our protocol provides
thus better asymptotic amortized cost than the state of the art protocol in [38]. (In the
initialization phase, the cost for the verifier is linear in |M | which is unavoidable when
aiming for security in the standard CRS-hybrid model.) We note that [38] does not
provide a concrete instantiation or efficiency analysis of their protocol, so we do not
compare it with the instantiation of our protocol in Section F.
Additionally, vector commitments allow for an easy way to prove statements about
the position read or written. To achieve the same in the protocol in [38], one would need
to include a “position” field in each element of M to be able to prove a statement about
the position.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have made a couple of design choices in FCD. For instance, all parties are authenti-
cated and the functionality implies interaction between P and V . Our functionality could
be extended, depending on the requirements of potential applications. For instance, a non-
interactive functionality would allow for applications with multiple verifiers. Another
extension of FCD could provide pseudonymity or anonymity, which would be suitable
for applications such as attribute-based credentials [9]. FCD is suitable for protocols in
which a one-dimensional array is adequate to implement the database. FCD could be
extended to more complex updatable data structures, such as multi-dimensional arrays,
lists, trees, and graphs. Of course, some of these would require operations beyond read
and write.
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A Universally Composable Security
The universal composability framework [11] is a framework for defining and analyz-
ing the security of cryptographic protocols so that security is retained under arbitrary
composition with other protocols. The security of a protocol is defined by means of an
ideal protocol that carries out the desired task. In the ideal protocol, all parties send their
inputs to an ideal functionality F for the task. The ideal functionality locally computes
the outputs of the parties and provides each party with its prescribed output.
The security of a protocol ϕ is analyzed by comparing the view of an environment
Z in a real execution of ϕ against that of Z in the ideal protocol defined in Fϕ. The
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environment Z chooses the inputs of the parties and collects their outputs. In the real
world, Z can communicate freely with an adversary A who controls both the network
and any corrupt parties. In the ideal world, Z interacts with dummy parties, who simply
relay inputs and outputs between Z and Fϕ, and a simulator S. We say that a protocol
ϕ securely realizes Fϕ if Z cannot distinguish the real world from the ideal world, i.e.,
Z cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with A and parties running protocol ϕ or
with S and dummy parties relaying to Fϕ.
A protocol ϕG securely realizes F in the G-hybrid model when ϕ is allowed to
invoke the ideal functionality G. Therefore, for any protocol ψ that securely realizes
the functionality G, the composed protocol ϕψ, which is obtained by replacing each
invocation of an instance of G with an invocation of an instance of ψ, securely realizes
F .
In the ideal functionalities described in this paper, we consider static corruptions.
When describing ideal functionalities, we use the following conventions as in [6].
Interface Naming Convention. An ideal functionality can be invoked by using one
or more interfaces. The name of a message in an interface consists of three fields
separated by dots, e.g., cd.read.ini in the committed database functionality described
in Section 3. The first field indicates the name of the functionality and is the same
in all interfaces of the functionality. This field is useful for distinguishing between
invocations of different functionalities in a hybrid protocol that uses two or more
different functionalities. The second field indicates the kind of action performed by
the functionality and is the same in all messages that the functionality exchanges
within the same interface. The third field distinguishes between the messages that
belong to the same interface, and can take six different values. A message ∗. ∗ .ini is
the incoming message received by the functionality, i.e., the message through which
the interface is invoked. A message ∗. ∗ .end is the outgoing message sent by the
functionality, i.e., the message that ends the execution of the interface. The message
∗. ∗ .sim is used by the functionality to send a message to the simulator, and the
message ∗. ∗ .rep is used to receive a message from the simulator. The message
∗. ∗ .req is used by the functionality to send a message to the simulator to request
the description of algorithms from the simulator, and the message ∗. ∗ .alg is used
by the simulator to send the description of those algorithms to the functionality.
Network vs local communication. The identity of an interactive Turing machine (ITM)
instance (ITI) consists of a party identifier pid and a session identifier sid . A set of
parties in an execution of a system of ITMs is a protocol instance if they have the
same session identifier sid . ITIs can pass direct inputs to and outputs from “local”
ITIs that have the same pid . An ideal functionality F has pid = ⊥ and is considered
local to all parties. An instance of F with the session identifier sid only accepts
inputs from and passes outputs to machines with the same session identifier sid .
Some functionalities require the session identifier to have some structure. Those
functionalities check whether the session identifier possesses the required structure
in the first message that invokes the functionality. For the subsequent messages, the
functionality implicitly checks that the session identifier equals the session identifier
used in the first message. Communication between ITIs with different party identi-
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fiers must take place over the network. The network is controlled by the adversary,
meaning that he can arbitrarily delay, modify, drop, or insert messages.
Query identifiers. Some interfaces in a functionality can be invoked more than once.
When the functionality sends a message ∗. ∗ .sim to the simulator in such an interface,
a query identifier qid is included in the message. The query identifier must also
be included in the response ∗. ∗ .rep sent by the simulator. The query identifier is
used to identify the message ∗. ∗ .sim to which the simulator replies with a message
∗. ∗ .rep. We note that, typically, the simulator in the security proof may not be
able to provide an immediate answer to the functionality after receiving a message
∗. ∗ .sim. The reason is that the simulator typically needs to interact with the copy
of the real adversary it runs in order to produce the message ∗. ∗ .rep, but the real
adversary may not provide the desired answer or may provide a delayed answer. In
such cases, when the functionality sends more than one message ∗. ∗ .sim to the
simulator, the simulator may provide delayed replies, and the order of those replies
may not follow the order of the messages received.
Aborts. When an ideal functionality F aborts after being activated with a message
sent by a party, we mean that F halts the execution of its program and sends a
special abortion message to the party that invoked the functionality. When an ideal
functionality F aborts after being activated with a message sent by the simulator, we
mean that F halts the execution of its program and sends a special abortion message
to the party that receives the outgoing message from F after F is activated by the
simulator.
Delayed outputs. We say that an ideal functionality F sends a public delayed output
v to a party P if it engages in the following interaction. F sends to the simulator
S a note that it is ready to generate an output to P . The note includes the value v,
the identity P , and a unique identifier for this output. When S replies to the note by
echoing the unique identifier, F outputs the value v to P . A private delayed output
is similar, but the value v is not included in the note.
B Security Definitions for Vector Commitments
Definition 1. A vector commitment scheme must be correct, hiding, and binding.
Correctness. Correctness requires that for par ← VC.Setup(1k, `), x = (x[1], . . . ,
x[n]) ← Mn, r ← R, com ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r), i ← [1, n] and w ←
VC.Wit(par , i,x, r), VC.Verify(par , com,x[i], i,w) outputs 1 with probability 1.
Hiding. The hiding property requires that any ppt adversary A has negligible advantage
in the following game. A chooses a vector and sends it to the challenger. The
challenger picks a random vector, commits to one of the vectors and sends the
commitment to A. A guesses which vector was used to compute the commitment.
More formally, for ` polynomial in k we require
Pr
par ← VC.Setup(1k, `); (x0, st)← A(par); r ← R;x1 ←M`; b← {0, 1}; com ← VC.Commit(par ,xb, r);
b′ ← A(st , com) : b = b′ ∧ x0 ∈M`
 = 1
2
+ (k) .
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When updating a commitment, we require that A cannot distinguish whether a
commitment com is an update of a commitment to a vector specified by the adversary
or a commitment to a random vector, i.e., that
Pr

par ← VC.Setup(1k, `); (x, j, x′, r, st)← A(par);
r′ ← R; x′ ←M`;
com ← VC.Commit(par ,x′, r′) :
1 = A(st , com) ∧ x ∈M` ∧ j ∈ [1, `] ∧ x′ ∈M ∧ r ∈ R
 =
Pr

par ← VC.Setup(1k, `); (x, j, x′, r, st)← A(par);
r′ ← R;
com ← VC.ComUpd(par ,VC.Commit(par ,x, r), j,x[j], r, x′, r′) :
1 = A(st , com) ∧ x ∈M` ∧ j ∈ [1, `] ∧ x′ ∈M ∧ r ∈ R

Binding. The binding property requires that no adversary can output a vector commit-
ment com , a position i ∈ [1, `], two values x and x′ and two respective witnesses w
and w ′ such that VC.Verify accepts both, i.e., for ` polynomial in k:
Pr
par ← VC.Setup(1k, `); (com, i, x, x′,w ,w ′)← A(par) :VC.Verify(par , com, x, i,w) = 1 ∧ x 6= x′ ∧
VC.Verify(par , com, x′, i,w ′) = 1 ∧ i ∈ [1, `] ∧ x, x′ ∈M
 ≤ (k) .
C Ideal Functionalities Used as Building Blocks
C.1 Ideal Functionality FCRS.SetupCRS
Our protocol uses the functionality FCRS.SetupCRS for common reference string generation
in [11]. FCRS.SetupCRS interacts with any parties P that obtain the common reference string,
and consists of one interface crs.get. A party P uses the crs.get interface to request
and receive the common reference string crs from FCRS.SetupCRS . In the first invocation,
FCRS.SetupCRS generates crs by running algorithm CRS.Setup. The simulator S also receives
crs .
Description of FCRS.SetupCRS . FCRS.SetupCRS is parameterized by a ppt algorithm CRS.Setup.
FCRS.SetupCRS interacts with any parties P that obtain the common reference string:
1. On input (crs.get.ini, sid) from any party P:
– If (sid , crs) is not stored, run crs ← CRS.Setup and store (sid , crs).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid ,P).
– Send (crs.get.sim, sid , qid , crs) to S.
S. On input (crs.get.rep, sid , qid) from the simulator S:
– Abort if (qid ,P) is not stored.
– Delete the record (qid ,P).
– Send (crs.get.end, sid , crs) to P .
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C.2 Ideal Functionality FAUT
Our protocol uses the functionality FAUT for an authenticated channel in [11]. FAUT
interacts with a sender T and a receiverR, and consists of one interface aut.send. T uses
the aut.send interface to send a message m to FAUT. FAUT leaks m to the simulator S
and, after receiving a response from S, FAUT sends m toR. S cannot modify m . The
session identifier sid contains the identities of T andR.
Description of FAUT. FAUT is parameterized by a message spaceM.
1. On input (aut.send.ini, sid ,m) from a party T :
– Abort if sid 6= (T ,R, sid ′) or if m /∈M.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid ,R,m).
– Send (aut.send.sim, sid , qid ,m) to S.
S. On input (aut.send.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid ,R,m) is not stored.
– Delete the record (qid ,R,m).
– Send (aut.send.end, sid ,m) toR.
C.3 Ideal Functionality FRZK for Zero-Knowledge
Let R be a polynomial time computable binary relation. For tuples (wit , ins) ∈ R we
call wit the witness and ins the instance. Our protocol uses the ideal functionality FRZK
for zero-knowledge in [11]. FRZK is parameterized by a description of a relation R, runs
with a prover P and a verifier V , and consists of one interface zk.prove. P uses zk.prove
to send a witness wit and an instance ins to FRZK. FRZK checks whether (wit , ins) ∈ R,
and, in that case, sends the instance ins to V . The simulator S learns ins but not wit .
Description ofFRZK. FRZK is parameterized by a description of a relation R.FRZK interacts
with a prover P and a verifier V .
1. On input (zk.prove.ini, sid ,wit , ins) from P:
– Abort if sid 6= (P,V, sid ′) or if (wit , ins) /∈ R.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ins).
– Send (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , ins) to S.
S. On input (zk.prove.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ins) is not stored.
– Parse sid as (P,V, sid ′).
– Delete the record (qid , ins).
– Send (zk.prove.end, sid , ins) to V .
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C.4 Ideal Functionality FNIC for Non-Interactive Commitments
Our protocol uses the functionality FNIC for non-interactive commitments in [6]. FNIC
interacts with parties Pi and consists of the following interfaces:
1. Any party Pi uses the com.setup interface to set up the functionality.
2. Any party Pi uses the com.commit interface to send a message cm and obtain
a commitment ccom and an opening copen . A commitment ccom = (ccom ′,
cparcom,COM.Verify), where ccom ′ is the commitment, cparcom are the public
parameters, and COM.Verify is the verification algorithm.
3. Any party Pi uses the com.validate interface to send a commitment ccom in order
to check that ccom contains the correct public parameters and verification algorithm.
4. Any party Pi uses the com.verify interface to send (ccom, cm, copen) in order to
verify that ccom is a commitment to the message cm with the opening copen .
FNIC can be realized by a perfectly hiding commitment scheme, such as Pedersen
commitments [6]. In [6], a method is described to use FNIC in order to ensure that a
party sends the same input cm to several ideal functionalities. For this purpose, the
party first uses com.commit to get a commitment ccom to cm with opening copen.
Then the party sends (ccom, cm, copen) as input to each of the functionalities, and
each functionality runs COM.Verify to verify the commitment. Finally, other parties
in the protocol receive the commitment ccom from each of the functionalities and
use the com.validate interface to validate ccom . Then, if ccom received from all the
functionalities is the same, the binding property provided by FNIC ensures that all the
functionalities received the same input cm . When using FNIC, it is needed to work in the
FNIC||SNIC-hybrid model, where SNIC is any simulator for a construction that realizes
FNIC.
Description of FNIC. COM.TrapCom, COM.TrapOpen and COM.Verify are ppt algo-
rithms.
1. On input (com.setup.ini, sid) from a party Pi:
– If (sid , cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom) is
already stored, include Pi in the set P, and send (com.setup.end, sid ,OK )
as a public delayed output to Pi.
– Otherwise proceed to generate a random qid , store (qid ,Pi) and send the
message (com.setup.req, sid , qid) to S.
S. On input (com.setup.alg, sid , qid ,m) from S:
– Abort if no pair (qid ,Pi) for some Pi is stored.
– Delete record (qid ,Pi).
– If (sid , cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom) is
already stored, include Pi in the set P and send (com.setup.end, sid ,OK )
to Pi.
– Otherwise proceed as follows.
• m is (cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom).
• Initialize both an empty table Tblcom and an empty set P, and store (sid ,
cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom).
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• Include Pi in the set P and send (com.setup.end, sid ,OK ) to Pi.
2. On input (com.validate.ini, sid , ccom) from any party Pi:
– Abort if Pi /∈ P.
– Parse ccom as (ccom ′, cparcom ′,COM.Verify′).
– Set v ← 1 if cparcom ′ = cparcom and COM.Verify′ = COM.Verify. Other-
wise, set v ← 0.
– Send (com.validate.end, sid , v) to Pi.
3. On input (com.commit.ini, sid , cm) from any party Pi:
– Abort if Pi /∈ P or if cm /∈M, whereM is defined in cparcom .
– Compute (ccom, cinfo)← COM.TrapCom(sid , cparcom, ctdcom).
– Abort if there is an entry [ccom, cm ′, copen ′, 1] in Tblcom such that cm 6= cm ′.
– Run copen ← COM.TrapOpen(sid , cm, cinfo).
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verify(sid , cparcom, ccom, cm, copen).
– Append [ccom, cm, copen, 1] to Tblcom.
– Set ccom ← (ccom, cparcom,COM.Verify).
– Send (com.commit.end, sid , ccom, copen) to Pi.
4. On input (com.verify.ini, sid , ccom, cm, copen) from any party Pi:
– Abort if Pi /∈ P or if cm /∈ M or if copen /∈ R, whereM and R are defined
in cparcom .
– Parse ccom as the tuple (ccom ′, cparcom ′,COM.Verify′). Abort if the parame-
ters cparcom ′ 6= cparcom or COM.Verify′ 6= COM.Verify.
– If there is an entry [ccom ′, cm, copen, u] in Tblcom, set v ← u.
– Else, proceed as follows:
• If there is an entry [ccom ′, cm ′, copen ′, 1] in Tblcom such that cm 6= cm ′,
set v ← 0.
• Else, proceed as follows:
∗ Set v ← COM.Verify(sid , cparcom, ccom ′, cm, copen).
∗ Append [ccom ′, cm, copen, v] to Tblcom.
– Send (com.verify.end, sid , v) to Pi.
C.5 Ideal Functionality FSMT
Our protocol uses the functionality FSMT for a secure channel in [11]. FSMT interacts
with a sender T and a receiver R, and consists of one interface smt.send. T uses the
smt.send interface to send a message m to FSMT. FSMT leaks l(m), where l leaks the
message length, to the simulator S. After receiving a response from S, FSMT sends m
toR. S cannot modify m . The session identifier sid contains the identities of T andR.
Description of FSMT. FSMT is parameterized by a message spaceM and by a leakage
function l :M→ N, which leaks the message length.
1. On input (smt.send.ini, sid ,m) from a party T :
– Abort if sid 6= (T ,R, sid ′) or if m /∈M.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid ,R,m).
– Send (smt.send.sim, sid , qid , l(m)) to S.
S. On input (smt.send.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid ,R,m) is not stored.
– Delete the record (qid ,R,m).
– Send (smt.send.end, sid ,m) toR.
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D ConstructionΠCD for a Committed Database
Our construction ΠCD uses a vector commitment (VC) scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit,
VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd, VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd). A vector commit-
ment com is used to store the table Tblcd. A position in the vector commitment acts as a
position in Tblcd, and the value committed to in that position acts as the value stored in
Tblcd in that position.
In the setup interface, P and V obtain the VC parameters par from the functionality
FCRS.SetupCRS for common reference string, which is parameterized by the setup algorithm
VC.Setup = CRS.Setup of the VC scheme. V receives as input a table Tblcd an computes
a commitment com to Tblcd with 0 randomness. V sends Tblcd to P by using the ideal
functionality FAUT for an authenticated channel, and P also computes a commitment
com to Tblcd with 0 randomness.
In the read interface, P receives as input a position i and a value vr , along with
commitments and openings (ccomi , copeni) and (ccomr , copenr ). P uses the ideal
functionality FRrZK for zero-knowledge proofs to prove to V that ccomi and ccomr
commit to i and vr such that vr is the message committed at position i in the commitment
com . This proves that [i, vr ] ∈ Tblcd.
In the write interface, P receives as input a position i and a value vw , along with
commitments and openings (ccomi , copeni) and (ccomw , copenw ). P updates the com-
mitment com to a commitment com ′ that commits to vw at position i, while other
positions remain unchanged. P uses the functionality FRwZK to prove to V that ccomi and
ccomw commit to i and vw , and that com ′ is an update of com where vw is committed
in the position i. We note that com ′ contains randomness chosen by P and thus, after
the first execution of the write interface, the committed table will be hidden from V .
Description of ΠCD. ΠCD uses a vector commitment scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit,
VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd, VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd) and the ideal func-
tionalities FVC.SetupCRS , FAUT, FRrZK and FRwZK . The table size Nmax is the maximum length
of a committed vector, and the universe of values Uv is given by the message space of
the VC scheme.
1. On input (cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblcd), V and P do the following:
– V aborts if (sid , cv , par , com) is already stored.
– V aborts if sid 6= (P,V, sid ′), or if Tblcd does not consist of entries of the form
[i, v], or if the number of entries in Tblcd is not Nmax , or if, for i = 1 to Nmax ,
v /∈ Uv for any entry [i, v] in Tblcd.
– V sends (crs.get.ini, sid) to FVC.SetupCRS and receives (crs.get.end, sid , par) from
FVC.SetupCRS . To compute par , FVC.SetupCRS runs VC.Setup(1k,Nmax ).
– V sets a counter cv ← 0 and a vector x such that, for i = 1 to Nmax , x[i] = v,
where [i, v] ∈ Tblcd. V sets r ← 0 and runs com ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r). V
stores (sid , cv , par , com).
– V sets sidAUT ← (V,P, sid ′) and sends (aut.send.ini, sidAUT,Tblcd) to the
functionality FAUT.
– P receives (aut.send.end, sidAUT,Tblcd) from FAUT.
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– P sets sid ← (P,V, sid ′) and aborts if (sid , cp, par , com,x, r) is already
stored.
– P aborts if Tblcd does not consist of entries of the form [i, v], or if the number
of entries in Tblcd is not Nmax , or if, for i = 1 to Nmax , v /∈ Uv for any entry
[i, v] in Tblcd.
– P sends (crs.get.ini, sid) toFVC.SetupCRS and receives (crs.get.end, sid , par) from
FVC.SetupCRS . To compute par , FVC.SetupCRS runs VC.Setup(1k,Nmax ).
– P sets a counter cp ← 0 and a vector x such that, for i = 1 to Nmax , x[i] = v,
where [i, v] ∈ Tblcd. P sets r ← 0 and runs com ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r). P
stores (sid , cp, par , com,x, r).
– P outputs (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tblcd).
2. On input (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomi, i , copeni, ccomr, vr, copenr), P and V do the
following:
– P aborts if (sid , cp, par , com,x, r) is not stored.
– P aborts if i /∈ [1,Nmax ], or if vr /∈ Uv , or if x[i ] 6= vr.
– P parses ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi).
– P parses ccomr as (ccom ′r, cparcomr,COM.Verifyr).
– P aborts if COM.Verifyi or COM.Verifyr are not ppt algorithms.
– P aborts if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi, ccomi, i , copeni).
– P aborts if 1 6= COM.Verifyr(cparcomr, ccomr, vr, copenr).
– If (sid , i ,w) is not stored, P runs w ← VC.Wit(par , i ,x, r) and stores (sid ,
i ,w).
– P sets witr ← (w , i , copeni, vr, copenr).
– P sets insr ← (par , com, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomr, ccom ′r, cp).
– P sends (zk.prove.ini, sid ,witr, insr) to FRrZK, where the relation Rr is
Rr ={(witr, insr) :
1 = COM.Verifyi(cparcomi, ccom
′
i, i , copeni) ∧ (7)
1 = COM.Verifyr(cparcomr, ccom
′
r, vr, copenr) ∧ (8)
1 = VC.Verify(par , com, vr, i ,w)} (9)
In equation 7, P proves that ccomi is a commitment to i with opening copeni.
Similarly, in equation 8, P proves that ccomr is a commitment to vr with
opening copenr. In equation 9, P proves that vr is stored in the position i of
the vector commitment com .
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sid , insr) from FRrZK.
– V aborts if (sid , cv , par , com) is not stored.
– V parses insr as (par ′, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomr, ccom ′r, cp).
– V aborts if cp 6= cv , or if par ′ 6= par , or if com ′ 6= com .
– V sets ccomi ← (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi) and ccomr ← (ccom ′r,
cparcomr,COM.Verifyr).
– V outputs (cd.read.end, sid , ccomi, ccomr).
3. On input (cd.write.ini, sid , ccomi, i , copeni, ccomw, vw, copenw), P and V do the
following:
– P aborts if (sid , cp, par , com,x, r) is not stored.
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– P aborts if i /∈ [1,Nmax ], or if vw /∈ Uv .
– P parses ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi).
– P parses ccomw as (ccom ′w, cparcomw,COM.Verifyw).
– P aborts if COM.Verifyi or COM.Verifyw are not ppt algorithms.
– P aborts if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi, ccomi, i , copeni).
– P aborts if 1 6= COM.Verifyw(cparcomw, ccomw, vw, copenw).
– If (sid , i ,w) is not stored, P runs w ← VC.Wit(par , i ,x, r) and stores (sid ,
i ,w).
– P picks random r′ ← R and runs com ′ ← VC.ComUpd(par , com, i , vr, r,
vw, r
′), where vr ← x[i ].
– P sets cp′ ← cp + 1.
– P sets witw ← (w , i , copeni, vr, vw, copenw, r, r′).
– P sets insw ← (par , com, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomw, ccom ′w, cp′).
– P sets x′ ← x and x′[i ]← vw.
– P replaces the stored tuple (sid , cp, par , com,x, r) by (sid , cp′, par , com ′,
x′, r′).
– For j = 1 to Nmax , if (sid , j,w) is stored, P runs w ′ ← VC.WitUpd(par ,w ,
j, i , x, r, x′, r′) and replaces (sid , j,w) by (sid , j,w ′).
– P sends (zk.prove.ini, sid ,witw, insw) to FRwZK , where Rw is
Rw ={(witw, insw) :
1 = COM.Verifyi(cparcomi, ccomi, i , copeni) ∧ (10)
1 = COM.Verifyw(cparcomw, ccomw, vw, copenw) ∧ (11)
1 = VC.VerComUpd(par , com, com ′,w , i , vr, r, vw, r′)} (12)
In equation 10 and equation 11, the prover proves that ccomi and ccomw are
commitments to i and vw respectively. In equation 12, the prover proves that
vr is stored in the position i in the vector commitment com , and that com ′ is a
vector commitment that stores the same values as com , except that it stores vw
in the position i and that its random value is r′ instead of r.
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sid , insw) from FRwZK .
– V aborts if (sid , cv , par , com) is not stored.
– V parses insw as ( ˆpar , ˆcom, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i, cparcomw, ccom ′w, cp).
– V aborts if cp 6= cv + 1, or if ˆpar 6= par , or if ˆcom 6= com .
– V sets cv ′ ← cv + 1 and replaces (sid , cv , par , com) by (sid , cv ′, par , com ′).
– V sets ccomi ← (ccom ′i, cparcomi,COM.Verifyi) and ccomw ← (ccom ′w,
cparcomw,COM.Verifyw).
– V outputs (cd.write.end, sid , ccomi, ccomw).
Theorem 2. ΠCD securely realizesFCD in theFVC.SetupCRS ,FAUT,FRrZK andFRwZK -hybrid
model if the VC scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit, VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd,
VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd) is hiding and binding as defined in Section B.
When P is corrupt, the binding property of the vector commitment scheme guarantees
that the adversary is not able to open the vector commitment to a position and a value if
that value was not previously committed at that position. When V is corrupt, the hiding
property of the VC scheme guarantees that the committed vector remains hidden from V .
We analyze in detail the security of ΠCD in Section E.
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E Security Analysis of ConstructionΠCD
Theorem 3. ΠCD securely realizesFCD in theFVC.SetupCRS ,FAUT,FRrZK andFRwZK -hybrid
model if the VC scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit, VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd,
VC.VerComUpd, VC.WitUpd) is hiding and binding as defined in Section B.
To prove that our construction ΠCD securely realizes the ideal functionality FCD,
we have to show that for any environment Z and any adversaryA there exists a simulator
S such that Z cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with A and the protocol in the
real world or with S and FCD. The simulator thereby plays the role of all honest parties
in the real world and interacts with FCD for all corrupt parties in the ideal world.
Our simulator S runs copies of the functionalities FVC.SetupCRS , FAUT, FRrZK and FRwZK .
When any of the copies of those functionalities aborts, S implicitly forwards the abortion
message to the adversary if the functionality sends the abortion message to a corrupt
party.
In Section E.1, we analyze the security of construction ΠCD when the prover P is
corrupt. In Section E.2, we analyze the security of construction ΠCD when the verifier V
is corrupt.
E.1 Security Analysis of Construction ΠCD when P is Corrupt
First, we describe the simulator S for the case in which the prover is corrupt.
Honest V sends Tblcd. On input (cd.setup.sim, sid ,Tblcd) from FCD, S sets sidAUT
← (V,P, sid ′) and runs a copy of FAUT on input (aut.send.ini, sidAUT,Tblcd).
When FAUT sends (aut.send.sim, sidAUT, qid ,Tblcd), S does the following:
– S sets cv ← 0.
– S runs a copy of FVC.SetupCRS on input (crs.get.ini, sid). When FVC.SetupCRS sends
(crs.get.sim, sid , qid , par), S sends (crs.get.rep, sid , qid) to FVC.SetupCRS , which
sends a message (crs.get.end, sid , par).
– For i = 1 to N , S sets x[i ]← v, where [i , v] ∈ Tblcd.
– S sets r ← 0 and computes a commitment com ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r).
– S stores a tuple (sid , cv , par ,x, com, r).
S sends (aut.send.sim, sidAUT, qid ,Tblcd) to A.
A receives Tblcd. On input (aut.send.rep, sidAUT, qid) from A, S runs FAUT on
input that message. When FAUT sends (aut.send.end, sidAUT,Tblcd), S sends
(cd.setup.rep, sid) to FCD. When FCD sends (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tblcd), S sends
(aut.send.end, sidAUT,Tblcd) to A.
A requests par . On input (crs.get.ini, sid) from A, S runs a copy of FVC.SetupCRS on that
input. When the copy of FVC.SetupCRS sends (crs.get.sim, sid , qid , par), S forwards
that message to A.
A receives par . On input (crs.get.rep, sid , qid) from A, S runs a copy of FVC.SetupCRS
on that input. When the copy of FVC.SetupCRS sends (crs.get.end, sid , par), S sends
(crs.get.end, sid , par) to A.
A starts a read proof. On input (zk.prove.ini, sid ,witr, insr) from A, S runs a copy
of FRrZK on that input. When the copy of FRrZK sends (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , insr),
S stores (qid ,witr, insr) and sends (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , insr) to A.
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A ends a read proof. On input (zk.prove.rep, sid , qid) from A, S runs a copy of FRrZK
on that input. When the copy of FRrZK outputs (zk.prove.end, sid , insr), S retrieves
the stored tuple (qid ,witr, insr) and parses the instance insr as (par ′, com ′,
cparcomi, ccom
′
i, cparcomr, ccom
′
r, cp). The simulator S sets the commitments
ccomi ← (ccom ′i , cparcomi,COM.Verify) and ccomr ← (ccom ′r , cparcomr,
COM.Verify). S sends (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomi , i , copeni , ccomr , vr , copenr ) to
the functionality FCD. When FCD sends (cd.read.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomr ),
S does the following:
– S retrieves the stored tuple (sid , cv , par ,x, com, r). If cp 6= cv , or if par ′ 6=
par , or if com ′ 6= com , S sends FCD a message that makes FCD abort.
– Else, S retrieves the stored tuple (qid ,witr, insr) and parses witr as (w , i ,
copeni , vr , copenr ). S retrieves the stored tuple (sid , cv , par ,x, com, r). If
x[i ] 6= vr , S outputs failure.
– Else, S sends (cd.read.rep, sid , qid) to FCD.
A starts a write proof. On input (zk.prove.ini, sid ,witw, insw) to FRwZK from A, S
runs a copy of FRwZK on that input. When the copy of FRwZK sends (zk.prove.sim, sid ,
qid , insw), S stores (qid ,witw, insw) and sends (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , insw) to
A.
A ends a write proof. On input (zk.prove.rep, sid , qid) fromA, S runs a copy ofFRwZK
on that input. When the copy of FRwZK outputs (zk.prove.end, sid , insw), S retrieves
the stored tuple (qid ,witw, insw) and parses the instance insw as ( ˆpar , ˆcom, com ′,
cparcomi, ccom
′
i, cparcomw, ccom
′
w, cp). S sets ccomi ← (ccom ′i , cparcomi,
COM.Verify) and ccomw ← (ccom ′w , cparcomw,COM.Verify). The simulator
S sends (cd.write.ini, sid , ccomi , i , copeni , ccomw , vw , copenw ) to FCD. When
FCD sends (cd.write.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomw ), S does the following:
– S retrieves the stored tuple (sid , cv , par ,x, com, r). If cp 6= cv + 1, or if ˆpar
6= par , or if ˆcom 6= com , S sends FCD a message that makes FCD abort.
– Else, S retrieves the stored tuple (qid ,witw, insw) and parses witw as (w ,
i , copeni , vr , vw , copenw , r, r
′). S retrieves the stored tuple (sid , cv , par ,x,
com, r). If x[i ] 6= vr , S outputs failure.
– Else, S sets cv ′ ← cv + 1, x′ ← x and x′[i ]← vw . S replaces (sid , cv , par ,
x, com, r) by (sid , cv ′, par ,x′, com ′, r′). S sends (cd.write.rep, sid , qid) to
FCD.
Theorem 4. When the prover P is corrupt, the construction ΠCD securely realizes
FCD in the FVC.SetupCRS , FAUT, FRrZK and FRwZK -hybrid model if the vector commitment
scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit, VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd, VC.VerComUpd,
VC.WitUpd) is binding as defined in Section B.
Proof of Theorem 4. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the envi-
ronment Z cannot distinguish between the ensemble REALCD,A,Z and the ensemble
IDEALFCD,S,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote by Pr [Game i] the proba-
bility that the environment distinguishes Game i from the real-world protocol.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol. Therefore,
Pr [Game 0] = 0.
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Game 1: Game 1 follows Game 0, except that Game 1 stores a tuple (sid , cv , par ,
x, com, r). Game 1 updates the values (cv ,x, com, r) of that tuple each time the
adversary sends a valid write proof. These changes do not alter the view of the
environment. Therefore, |Pr [Game 1]− Pr [Game 0]| = 0.
Game 2: Game 2 follows Game 1, except that, when the adversary sends a valid read
proof with witness witr and instance insr, Game 2 outputs failure if the values i
and vr in the witness are such that x[i ] 6= vr , where x[i ] is in the stored tuple (sid ,
cv , par ,x, com, r). Similarly, when the adversary sends a valid write proof with
witness witw and instance insw, Game 2 outputs failure if the values i and vr in
the witness are such that x[i ] 6= vr , where x[i ] is in the stored tuple (sid , cv , par ,
x, com, r). The probability that Game 2 outputs failure is bound by the following
claim.
Theorem 5. Under the binding property of the vector commitment scheme, we have
that |Pr [Game 2]− Pr [Game 1]| ≤ Advbin−vcA .
Proof of Theorem 5. We construct an algorithm B that, given an adversary that
makes Game 2 fail with non-negligible probability, breaks the binding property
of the vector commitment scheme with non-negligible probability. B behaves as
Game 2 with the following three modifications:
– When the challenger sends the parameters par , B stores par as common refer-
ence string in the copy of FVC.SetupCRS .
– When the adversary sends a valid read proof with witness witr = (w , i , copeni ,
vr , copenr ) and instance insr = (par
′, com ′, cparcomi, ccom
′
i , cparcomr,
ccom ′r , cp) such that the values i and vr in the witness fulfill x[i ] 6= vr , where
x[i ] is in the stored tuple (sid , cv , par ,x, com, r), B runs w ′ ← VC.Wit(par ,
i ,x, r) and sends (com, i , vr ,x[i ],w ,w ′) to the challenger.
– When the adversary sends a valid write proof with the witness witw = (w ,
i , copeni , vr , vw , copenw , r, r
′) and the instance insw = ( ˆpar , ˆcom, com ′,
cparcomi, ccom
′
i , cparcomw, ccom
′
w , cp) such that the values i and vr in the
witness fulfill x[i ] 6= vr , where x[i ] is in the stored tuple (cv ,x, com, r, par),
B runs w ′ ← VC.Wit(par , i ,x, r) and sends (com, i , vr ,x[i ],w ,w ′) to the
challenger.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
The distribution of Game 2 is identical to our simulation. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 4.
E.2 Security Analysis of Construction ΠCD when V is Corrupt
We describe the simulator S for the case in which the verifier is corrupt.
A requests par . On input (crs.get.ini, sid) fromA, S runs the copy ofFVC.SetupCRS on that
input. When the copy of FVC.SetupCRS sends (crs.get.sim, sid , qid , par), S forwards
that message to A.
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A receives par . On input (crs.get.rep, sid , qid) from A, S runs the copy of function-
ality FVC.SetupCRS on that input. When the copy of FVC.SetupCRS sends (crs.get.end, sid ,
par), S forwards that message to A.
A sends Tblcd. On input (aut.send.ini, sidAUT,Tblcd) fromA, the simulator S checks
that sidAUT = (V,P, sid ′) and runs a copy of FAUT on that input. When FAUT
sends (aut.send.sim, sidAUT, qid ,Tblcd), S sends (cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblcd) to the
functionality FCD. When FCD sends (cd.setup.sim, sid ,Tblcd), S sends the mes-
sage (aut.send.sim, sidAUT, qid ,Tblcd) to A.
Honest P receives Tblcd. On input (aut.send.rep, sidAUT, qid) from A, S runs the
copy of FAUT on that input. When FAUT sends (aut.send.end, sidAUT,Tblcd), S
does the following:
– S sets cp ← 0.
– For i = 1 to N , S sets x[i ]← v, where [i , v] ∈ Tblcd.
– S sets r ← 0 and computes a commitment com ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r).
– S runs a copy of FVC.SetupCRS on input (crs.get.ini, sid). When FVC.SetupCRS sends
(crs.get.sim, sid , qid , par), S sends (crs.get.rep, sid , qid) to FVC.SetupCRS , which
sends a message (crs.get.end, sid , par).
– S stores a tuple (sid , cp, par , com).
S sends (cd.setup.rep, sid) to FCD.
Honest P starts a read proof. On input (cd.read.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomr ) from
FCD, S does the following:
– S retrieves the stored tuple (sid , cp, par , com).
– S parses ccomi as the tuple (ccom ′i , cparcomi,COM.Verify) and ccomr as the
tuple (ccom ′r , cparcomr ,COM.Verifyr ).
– S sets insr as (par , com, cparcomi, ccom ′i , cparcomr, ccom ′r , cp) and stores
(qid , insr).
– S sends (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , insr) to A.
A receives a read proof. On input (zk.prove.rep, sid , qid) from A, S does the follow-
ing:
– S sends an abortion message to A if (qid , insr) is not stored.
– S sends (cd.write.rep, sid , qid) to FCD and receives (cd.read.end, sid , ccomi ,
ccomr ) from FCD.
– S deletes the record (qid , insr).
– S sends (zk.prove.end, sid , insr) to A.
Honest P starts a write proof. On input (cd.write.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomw ) from
FCD, S does the following:
– S retrieves the stored tuple (sid , cp, par , com).
– S sets cp′ ← cp + 1.
– S picks a random vector x←MNmax and random r ← R.
– S computes a vector commitment com ′ ← VC.Commit(par ,x, r).
– S parses ccomi as the tuple (ccom ′i , cparcomi,COM.Verify) and ccomw as
the tuple (ccom ′w , cparcomw ,COM.Verifyw ).
– S sets the instance insw as (par , com, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i , cparcomw,
ccom ′w , cp
′) and stores (qid , insw).
– S sends (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , insw) to A.
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A receives write proof. On input (zk.prove.rep, sid , qid) from A, S does the follow-
ing:
– S sends an abortion message to A if (qid , insw) is not stored.
– S sends (cd.write.rep, sid , qid) toFCD and receives (cd.write.end, sid , ccomi ,
ccomw ) from FCD.
– S parses insw as (par , com, com ′, cparcomi, ccom ′i , cparcomw, ccom ′w , cp′).
S replaces the stored tuple (sid , cp, par , com) by (sid , cp′, par , com ′).
– S deletes the record (qid , insw).
– S sends (zk.prove.end, sid , insw) to A.
Theorem 6. When the verifier V is corrupt, the construction ΠCD securely realizes
FCD in the FVC.SetupCRS , FAUT, FRrZK and FRwZK -hybrid model if the vector commitment
scheme (VC.Setup, VC.Commit, VC.Wit, VC.Verify, VC.ComUpd, VC.VerComUpd,
VC.WitUpd) is hiding as defined in Section B.
Proof of Theorem 6. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the envi-
ronment Z cannot distinguish between the ensemble REALCD,A,Z and the ensemble
IDEALFCD,S,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote by Pr [Game i] the proba-
bility that the environment distinguishes Game i from the real-world protocol.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol. Therefore,
Pr [Game 0] = 0.
Game 1: Game 1 follows Game 0, except that Game 1 runs an initialization phase
and stores a tuple (sid , cp, par , com). Game 1 updates the values (cp, com) of that
tuple each time the honest prover sends a write proof. These changes do not alter
the view of the environment. Therefore, |Pr [Game 1]− Pr [Game 0]| = 0.
Game 2: Game 2 follows Game 1, except that, when the honest prover sends a read
proof, Game 2 does not run FRrZK to compute the messages (zk.prove.sim, sid ,
qid , insr) and (zk.prove.end, sid , insr). Instead, Game 2 creates the messages
directly by using the instance insr, i.e., without knowledge of the witness witr.
Similarly, when the honest prover sends a write proof, Game 2 does not run FRwZK to
compute the messages (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , insw) and (zk.prove.end, sid , insw).
Instead, Game 2 creates the messages directly by using the instance insw, i.e.,
without knowledge of the witness witw. These changes do not alter the view of the
environment. Therefore, |Pr [Game 2]− Pr [Game 1]| = 0.
Game 3: Game 3 follows Game 2, except that, when the honest prover sends a read
proof with instance insr, Game 3 replaces the vector commitment com in insr
by the vector commitment to a random vector that is in the stored tuple (sid , cp,
par , com). Similarly, when the adversary sends a valid write proof with instance
insw, Game 3 replaces the vector commitment com by the vector commitment to
a random vector that is in the stored tuple(sid , cp, par , com), and com ′ by a new
vector commitment to a random vector. The probability that Game 2 and Game 3
are distinguished by the environment is bound by the following claim.
Theorem 7. Let M be the number of write proofs sent by the honest prover. Under
the hiding property of the vector commitment scheme, |Pr [Game 3]−Pr [Game 2]| ≤
M · Advhid−vcA .
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Proof of Theorem 7. We define a sequence of games. In Game 2.i, for the last i
write proofs sent by the honest prover, the vector commitment com ′ is replaced
by a vector commitment to a random vector. Therefore, Game 2.0 corresponds to
Game 2, while Game 2.M corresponds to Game 3.
We construct an algorithm B that, given an adversary that distinguishes Game 2.i
from Game 2.(i+ 1) with non-negligible probability, breaks the hiding property of
the vector commitment scheme with non-negligible probability. B works as follows.
When the challenger sends the parameters par , B stores par as common reference
string in the copy of FVC.SetupCRS . B replaces the vector commitment com ′ by a vector
commitment to a random vector in the last i+ 1 proofs sent by the honest prover.
(We note that com ′ in a write proof becomes com in the next write proof). For the
proof i, B sends to the challenger a message (x, j, x, r), where x and r are the
vector and random values used to compute com and j and x′ are the position and
the value that need to be updated to compute com ′. The challenger sends back a
commitment com ′. As can be seen, if com ′ is a commitment to a random vector, the
situation corresponds to Game 2.(i+1), while otherwise the situation corresponds to
Game 2.i. Therefore, if the adversary distinguishes Game 2.i from Game 2.(i+ 1)
with non-negligible probability, B can use the adversary’s guess to break the hiding
property of the commitment scheme. This concludes the proof of Theorem 7.
The distribution of Game 3 is identical to our simulation. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 6.
F Efficient Instantiation of ConstructionΠCD
We describe our instantiation of ΠCD. Our instantiation is based on a vector commitment
(VC) scheme secure under the DHE assumption and on zero-knowledge proofs for the
relations Rr and Rw for that vector commitment scheme. To compute those proofs, the
vector commitment scheme is extended with a structure-preserving signature scheme.
We use Pedersen commitments as the commitment scheme used to realize functionality
FNIC.
In Section F.1, we recall bilinear maps, the notation we use to describe ZK proofs,
signature schemes and commitment schemes. In Section F.2, we describe a VC scheme
secure under the DHE assumption and, in Section F.3, we describe the ZK proofs for
relations Rr and Rw. We analyze the efficiency of our instantiation in Section F.4.
F.1 Building blocks of Our Instantiation
Bilinear maps. LetG, G˜ andGt be groups of prime order p. A map e : G×G˜→ Gt must
satisfy bilinearity, i.e., e(gx, g˜y) = e(g , g˜)xy; non-degeneracy, i.e., for all generators
g ∈ G and g˜ ∈ G˜, e(g , g˜) generates Gt; and efficiency, i.e., there exists an efficient
algorithm G(1k ) that outputs the pairing group setup grp ← (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) and
an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for any a ∈ G, b ∈ G˜. If G = G˜ the map is
symmetric, otherwise it is asymmetric.
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Notation for ZK Proofs of Knowledge. We use classical results for efficient zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge for discrete logarithm relations. In the notation of [8], a
UC zero-knowledge protocol proving knowledge of exponents (w1, . . . , wn) satisfying
the formula φ(w1, . . . , wn) is described as
Kw1, . . . , wn : φ(w1, . . . , wn) (13)
The formula φ(w1, . . . , wn) consists of conjunctions and disjunctions of “atoms”. An
atom expresses group relations, such as
∏k
j=1 g
Fj
j = 1, where the gj’s are elements of
prime order groups and the Fj’s are polynomials in the variables (w1, . . . , wn).
A proof system for (13) can be transformed into a proof system for the following
more expressive statements about secret exponents sexps and secret bases sbases:
Ksexps, sbases : φ(sexps, bases ∪ sbases) (14)
The transformation adds an additional base h to the public bases. For each gj ∈ sbases ,
the transformation picks a random exponent ρj and computes a blinded base g′j = gjh
ρj .
The transformation adds gj to the public bases bases , ρj to the secret exponents sexps ,
and rewrites gFjj into g
′
j
Fjh−Fjρj .
The proof system supports pairing product equations
∏k
j=1 e(gj , g˜j)
Fj = 1 in
groups of prime order with a bilinear map e , by treating the target group Gt as the group
of the proof system. The embedding for secret bases is unchanged, except for the case
in which both bases in a pairing are secret. In the latter case, e(gj , g˜j)Fj needs to be
transformed into e(g′j , g˜
′
j)
Fje(g′j , h˜)
−Fjρje(h, g˜′j)
−Fj ρ˜je(h, h˜)−Fjρj ρ˜j .
Structure-Preserving Signatures. A signature scheme consists of the algorithms KeyGen,
Sign and VfSig. Algorithm KeyGen(1k ) outputs a secret key sk and a public key pk ,
which include a description of the message spaceM. Sign(sk ,m) outputs a signature s
on the message m ∈M. VfSig(pk , s,m) outputs 1 if s is a valid signature on m and 0
otherwise. This definition can be extended to blocks of messages m¯ = (m1, . . . ,mn).
In this case, KeyGen(1k ,n) receives the maximum number of messages as input. A sig-
nature scheme must fulfill the correctness and existential unforgeability properties [24].
In structure-preserving signatures (SPS), the public key, the messages, and the
signatures are group elements in G and G˜, and verification must consist purely in the
checking of pairing product equations. We employ SPS to sign group elements, while still
supporting efficient zero-knolwedge proofs of signature possession. For concreteness, we
recall the scheme proposed by [1] for the case in which a elements in G and b elements
in G˜ are signed.
KeyGen(grp, a, b). Let grp ← (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) be the bilinear map parameters.
Pick at random u1, . . . , ub, v, w1, . . . wa, z ← Z∗p and compute Ui = gui , i ∈ [1..b],
V = g˜v , Wi = g˜wi , i ∈ [1..a] and Z = g˜z . Return the verification key pk ← (grp,
U1, . . . , Ub, V,W1, . . . ,Wa, Z) and the signing key sk ← (pk , u1, . . . , ub, v, w1,
. . . , ua, z).
Sign(sk , 〈m1, . . . ,ma+b〉). Pick r ← Z∗p, compute R← gr, S ← gz−rv
∏a
i=1m
−wi
i ,
and T ← (g˜∏bi=1m−uia+i )1/r, and output the signature s ← (R,S, T ).
VfSig(pk , s, 〈m1, . . . ,ma+b〉). Output 1 if e(R, V )e(S, g˜)
∏a
i=1 e(mi,Wi) = e(g, Z)
and e(R, T )
∏b
i=1 e(Ui,ma+i) = e(g, g˜).
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Commitment Schemes. A commitment scheme consists of algorithms CSetup, Com and
VfCom. The algorithm CSetup(1k ) generates the parameters of the commitment scheme
parc , which include a description of the message space M. Com(parc , x ) outputs a
commitment com to x ∈ M and some auxiliary information open . The verification
algorithm VfCom(parc , com, x , open) outputs 1 if com is a commitment to x ∈ M
with some auxiliary information open or 0 if that is not the case. A commitment scheme
should fulfill the correctness, trapdoor and binding properties as described in [6].
The Pedersen commitment scheme [41] fulfills the correctness, trapdoor and binding
properties. In [6], it is proven that any commitment scheme that fulfills those properties
fulfills the ideal functionality FNIC in Section C.4. The Pedersen commitment scheme
works as follows. CSetup(1k ) takes a group G of prime order p with generator g ,
picks random α, computes h ← gα and sets the parameters parc ← (G, g , h), which
include a description of the message spaceM← Zp. Com(parc , x ) picks random open
← Zp and outputs a commitment com ← gxhopen to x ∈ M and some auxiliary
information open . The verification algorithm VfCom(parc , com, x , open) outputs 1 if
com = gxhopen .
F.2 A VC Scheme From the DHE Assumption
We show a vector commitment scheme that is secure under the Diffie-Hellman Exponent
(DHE) assumption [34]. Let k ∈ N denote the security parameter and a ∈ {0, 1}∗ denote
an input. We recall the t-DHE assumption.
Definition 2 (`-DHE). Let (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) ← G(1k) and α ← Zp. Given (p,G,
G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) and a tuple (g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`) such that gi = g(α
i) and
g˜i = g˜
(αi), for any p.p.t. adversaryA, Pr[g(α`+1) ← A(p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜ , g1, g˜1, . . . ,
g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`)] ≤ (k).
VC.Setup(1k, `). Generate groups (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) ← G(1k), pick α ← Zp, and
compute (g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`), where gi = g(α
i) and g˜i = g˜(α
i). Out-
put the parameters par = (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜ , g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`,M
= Zp,R = Zp).
VC.Commit(par ,x, r). Let |x| = n ≤ `. Output
com = gr ·
n∏
j=1
g
x[j]
`+1−j = g
r · gx[1]` · · · gx[n]`+1−n .
VC.Wit(par , i,x, r). Let |x| = n ≤ `. Output
w = gri ·
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
g
x[j]
`+1−j+i .
VC.Verify(par , com, x, i,w). Output 1 if e(com, g˜i) = e(w , g˜) ·e(g1, g˜`)x, else output
0.
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VC.ComUpd(par , com, j, x, r, x′, r′). Output the commitment
com ′ = com · g
r′ · gx′`+1−j
gr · gx`+1−j
= com · gr′−r · gx′−x`+1−j .
VC.VerComUpd(par , com, com ′,w , j, x, r, x′, r′). Run v ← VC.Verify(par , com, x,
j,w). If v ← 0, output v, else run ¯com ← VC.ComUpd(par , com, j, x, r, x′, r′). If
¯com = com ′, output 1, else output 0.
VC.WitUpd(par ,w , i, j, x, r, x′, r′). If i = j, output w . Otherwise output the witness
w ′ = w · g
r′
i · gx
′
`+1−j+i
gri · gx`+1−j+i
= w · gr′−ri · gx
′−x
`+1−j+i .
Theorem 8. This vector commitment scheme is correct, hiding, and binding under as
defined in Section B under the `-DHE assumption.
Correctness can be checked as follows.
e(com, g˜i)/e(w , g˜) =
e(gr+
∑n
j=1 x[j](α
`+1−j), g˜(α
i))
e(g(r(α
i)+
∑n
j=1,j 6=i x[j](α`+1−j+i)), g˜)
=
e(gr(α
i)+
∑n
j=1 x[j](α
`+1−j+i), g˜)
e(g(r(α
i)+
∑n
j=1,j 6=i x[j](α`+1−j+i)), g˜)
= e(g , g˜)x[i](α
`+1)
= e(g1, g˜`)
x[i] .
This vector commitment scheme fulfills the hiding property in an information-theoretic
way.
We show that this vector commitment scheme fulfills the binding property under
the `-DHE assumption. Given an adversary A that breaks the binding property with
non-negligible probability ν, we construct an algorithm T that breaks the `-DHE as-
sumption with non-negligible probability ν. First, T receives an instance (e,G, G˜,
Gt, p, g , g˜ , g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`) of the `-DHE assumption. T sets par ←
(p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜ , g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`) and sends par to A. A returns
(com, i, x, x′,w ,w ′) such that VC.Verify(par , com, x, i,w) = 1, VC.Verify(par , com,
x′, i,w ′) = 1, i ∈ [1, `], x, x′ ∈M, and x 6= x′. T computes g`+1 as follows:
e(w , g˜)e(g1, g˜`)
x = e(w ′, g˜)e(g1, g˜`)x
′
e(w/w ′, g˜) = e(g1, g˜`)x
′−x
e((w/w ′)1/(x
′−x), g˜) = e(g1, g˜`)
e((w/w ′)1/(x
′−x), g˜) = e(g`+1, g˜) .
The last equation implies that g`+1 = (w/w ′)1/(x
′−x). T returns (w/w ′)1/(x′−x) as a
solution for the `-DHE problem.
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F.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs forRr andRw
In our construction ΠCD for a committed database, we need to compute two zero-
knowledge proofs: a proof for a read operation and a proof for a write operation. We
describe these proofs for the `-DHE vector commitment scheme.
For a read operation, we need a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a witness w
that a value x was committed to in a vector commitment com at position i. I.e., we need
to compute a proof
Ki, openi, x, openx,w , open, openi :
1 = VfCom(parc , comi, i, openi) ∧
1 = VfCom(parc , comx, x, openx) ∧
1 = VC.Verify(par , com, x, i,w).
This proof involves proving knowledge of a position i, a value x and a witness w such
that the verification equation e(com, g˜i) = e(w , g)e(g1, g˜`)x holds. Additionally, it
involves proving that the position i is committed in a commitment comi with opening
openi, and the value x is committed in a commitment comx with opening openx.
Because α is secret, the relation between g˜i = g˜α
i
and i is not efficiently provable.
For this reason, we extend the parameters of the vector commitment scheme with
structure preserving signatures that bind i with g˜i. We also need to bind i with g`+1−i
for a zero-knowledge proof of a write operation. To this end, the setup algorithm of the
vector commitment scheme is extended as follows.
VC.Setup(1k, `). Generate groups (p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜) ← G(1k), pick α ← Zp, and
compute (g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`), where gi = g(α
i) and g˜i = g˜(α
i). Com-
pute (sk , pk) ← KeyGen(grp, 2, 1). For i ∈ [1, `], run si ← Sign(sk , 〈g i, g`+1−i,
g˜i〉). Compute additional bases h← G and h˜ ← G˜. Output the parameters par =
(p,G, G˜,Gt, e, g , g˜ , g1, g˜1, . . . , g`, g˜`, g`+2, . . . , g2`, pk , s1, . . . , s`, h, h˜,M = Zp,
R = Zp).
Let (g , h) be the parameters of the Pedersen commitment scheme. Let (U1, V,W1,
W2, Z) be the public key of the signature scheme. Let (R,S, T ) be a signature on (g i,
g`+1−i, g˜i). Following the notation described in Section F.1, we describe the proof as
follows.
Ki, openi, x, openx, g˜i, g`+1−i,w , R, S, T :
comi = g
ihopeni ∧ (15)
comx = g
xhopenx ∧ (16)
e(R, V )e(S, g˜)e(g,W1)
ie(g`+1−i,W2)e(g, Z)−1 = 1 ∧ (17)
e(R, T )e(U1, g˜i)e(g, g˜)
−1 = 1 ∧ (18)
e(com, g˜i)
−1e(w , g˜)e(g1, g˜`)x = 1 (19)
Equation 15 and Equation 16 prove knowledge of the openings of the Pedersen commit-
ments comi and comx. Equation 17 and Equation 18 prove knowledge of a signature
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(R,S, T ) on a message (g i, g`+1−i, g˜i). Equation 19 proves that the value x in comx is
equal to the value committed in the position i of the vector commitment com . We recall
that, to prove knowledge of the secret bases (g˜i,w , R, S, T ), the equations need to be
modified as described in Section F.1.
For a write operation, we need a zero-knowledge proof that a vector commitment
com ′ is an update of a vector commitment com that contains randomness r’ instead of r
and value x′ instead of x at a position i.
Ki, openi, x
′, openx′ , x, r, x
′, r′,w :
1 = VfCom(parc , comi, i, openi) ∧
1 = VfCom(parc , comx′ , x
′, openx′) ∧
1 = VC.VerComUpd(par , com, com ′,w , i, x, r, x′, r′)
Let (g , h) be the parameters of the Pedersen commitment scheme. Let (U1, V,W1,
W2, Z) be the public key of the signature scheme. Let (R,S, T ) be a signature on (g i,
g`+1−i, g˜i). We describe the proof as follows.
Ki, openi, x
′, open ′x, r
′ − r, g˜i, g`+1−i,w , R, S, T :
comi = g
ihopeni ∧ (20)
comx′ = g
x′hopenx′ ∧ (21)
e(R, V )e(S, g˜)e(g,W1)
ie(g`+1−i,W2)e(g, Z)−1 = 1 ∧ (22)
e(R, T )e(U1, g˜i)e(g, g˜)
−1 = 1 ∧ (23)
e(com, g˜i)
−1e(w , g˜)e(g1, g˜`)x = 1 ∧ (24)
com ′/com = gr
′−r · gx′−x`+1−i (25)
Equation 20 and Equation 21 prove knowledge of the openings of the Pedersen commit-
ments comi and comx′ . Equation 22 and Equation 23 prove knowledge of a signature
(R,S, T ) on a message (g i, g`+1−i, g˜i). Equation 24 proves that the value x in comx
is equal to the value committed in the position i of the vector commitment com . Equa-
tion 25 proves that com ′ is an update of com that contains x′ instead of x at position
i. We recall that, to prove knowledge of the secret bases (g˜i, g`+1−i,w , R, S, T ), the
equations need to be modified as described in Section F.1.
F.4 Efficiency Analysis
We now provide the efficiency analysis of our construction analyzing the storage, com-
munication, and computation costs. We summarize it in Table 1.
Storage Cost. The prover stores the common reference string, which consists of the
parameters of the vector commitment scheme. Its size grows linearly with the maximum
size of the database. Throughout the protocol execution, in addition to the common
reference string, the prover also stores the last update of the vector commitment, the
committed vector, the randomness used to compute that commitment, and the witnesses
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computed so far. In conclusion, the storage cost for the prover grows linearly with the
maximum size of the database.
The verifier also stores the common reference string. Although in our generic con-
struction in Section 5, the verifier stores the whole common reference string, we observe
that in our instantiation this is not necessary. In practice, the verifier only needs to store
(g , g˜ , h, h˜, g1, g˜`) and the public key (U1, V,W1,W2, Z) of the signature scheme. These
values suffice to verify the zero-knowledge proofs for read and write operations. In
addition to the common reference string, the verifier only needs to store the last update
of the vector commitment. Therefore, the storage cost for the verifier is constant and
independent of the database size.
Communication Cost. In the setup phase, the communication grows with the database
size because the verifier sends the table Tblcd to the prover. We note that this step can be
avoided in practice if Tblcd is initialized to default values known by prover and verifier.
In a read operation, the prover and the verifier run a zero-knowledge proof for Rr. As
can be seen in Section F.2, the size of the witness and of the instance is constant and
independent of the size of the database. Therefore, the communication cost of the proof
is independent of the size of the database. Similarly, in a write operation, the prover
sends a zero-knowledge proof for Rw to the verifier. The size of the witness and of the
instance is also independent of the database size, and thus the communication cost of the
proof is independent of the database size.
Computation Cost. To compute a proof for a read operation, the prover first needs to
compute a VC witness for the position to be read. If a witness w was not computed
before, the computation cost of this step grows linearly with the size of the database.
However, if a witness has already been computed, the computation cost can be reduced.
Concretely, if the database was not updated since the moment w was computed, the
same witness w can be reused. If the database was updated, w can be updated to obtain
a valid witness w ′. The computation cost of this update grows linearly with the number
of times the database was updated, but is independent of the database size.
The remaining steps in the computation of the proof for Rr are also independent of
the database size. Therefore, we observe that, after computing a witness w for a position,
the remaining proofs can be computed with cost independent of the database size.
A proof for a write operation also requires the computation of a witness w for the
position to be written. The same optimization used for a read proof can be applied here,
i.e., if a witness for that position has already been computed, a new witness can be
computed with cost independent of the database size. In addition to the witness, the
prover also needs to update the vector commitment. The computation cost of a vector
commitment update is also independent of the size of the database. The remaining steps
in the computation of the proof for Rw are also independent of the database size.
Efficiency measurements. Let |G|, |G˜|, and |Gt| be the bit length of G, G˜, and Gt,
respectively. In the DHE VC scheme, given the maximum vector length `, the parameters
are of size (4`+ 2) · |G|+ (3`+ 5) · |G˜|. (This includes the signatures needed for the
proofs for relations Rr and Rw.) We recall that the verifier only needs to store a small
part of the parameters, whose length is 4 · |G| + 7 · |G˜|. A vector commitment and a
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Table 1. Efficiency analysis of our construction, where |G|, |G˜| and |Gt| are the bit lengths of G,
G˜ and Gt, respectively, and ` is the maximum vector length.
Prover Verifier
Param Size (4`+ 2) · |G|+ (3`+ 5) · |G˜| 4 · |G|+ 7 · |G˜|
Communication Cost
Setup const. const.
Read const. const.
Write const. const.
Computation Cost
Setup |DB| const.
DB not updated const. (same w and com) const.
DB updated nupd times ∼ nupd const.
witness are of length 1 · |G|. The cost of computing a vector commitment or a witness
increases with the vector length, but the cost of updating commitments and witnesses
increases only with the number of updated elements. Verifying a witness requires the
computation of 3 pairings.
To compute the UC ZK proofs for Rr and Rw, we can use the compiler described
in [8]. The public parameters of the proof system contain a public key of the Paillier
encryption scheme, the parameters for a multi-integer commitment scheme and the
specification of a DSA group. The cost of a proof depends on the number of secret
elements in the witness, which is 11 in Rr and 12 in Rw, and of the number of equations
composed by Boolean ANDs, which is 5 in Rr and 6 in Rw. The computation cost for the
prover of a Σ-protocol for Rr or for Rw involves one evaluation of each of the equations
and one multiplication per secret value in the witness. The compiler in [8] extends a
Σ-protocol and requires, additionally, a computation of a multi-integer commitment that
commits to the secret values in the witness, an evaluation of a Paillier encryption for
each of the secret values in the witness, a Σ-protocol to prove that the commitment and
the encryptions are correctly generated, and 3 exponentiations in the DSA group. The
computation cost for the verifier, as well as the communication cost, also depend on the
number of secret values in the witness and on the number of equations. Therefore, as the
number of secret values in the witness and of equations is constant in our proofs for Rr
and Rw, the computation and communication cost of our proofs do not depend on the
length of the committed vector.
G Application of Functionality FCD to Efficient OR Proofs
Intuition. Despite a large number of use cases for OR proofs, they are usually avoided
due to their inefficiency: typically the size of a zero-knowledge proof for an OR-relation
grows with the number N of values involved. We illustrate how FCD and FNIC can be
used to compute efficient zero-knowledge proofs for OR-relations. In a nutshell, the
protocol works as follows. Let x be a list of N values. The prover wishes to prove that
at least one of the values fulfils a statement. First, the prover writes x into the committed
39
database by using the cd.write interface of FCD. Let x[i] (i ∈ [1, N ]) be a value that
fulfils the statement. Then, the prover obtains commitments ccomi and ccomr from
FNIC to the position i and the value v = x[i], respectively. The prover uses the cd.read
interface of functionality FCD to prove that ccomi and ccomr together commit to an
entry [i, v] that is stored in the database. Finally, the prover uses functionality FRZK for
the relation R defined by the required statement to prove that the value v in ccomr fulfils
the statement. In our protocol, the cost of writing the list of N values into the database
grows with N . However, after that, the prover can compute multiple OR proofs of size
independent of N , and thus the cost of writing the values into the database is amortized.
We remark that our protocol is also applicable when the OR proof involves a subset
of the values. For example, if only the values x[i] for i ∈ [1, N ′], with N ′ < N , are
involved, the prover uses a range proof to prove that i ∈ [1, N ′], where i is the position
in the commitment ccomi read from the database.
OR proof example. Let KeyGen, Sign and VfSig be a signature scheme and let CSetup,
Com and VfCom be a commitment scheme as defined in Section F.1. Consider a protocol
where the prover must prove to the verifier, at separate steps in the protocol, three
statements: (1) that he possesses a signature s verifiable with public key pk on N
messages (m1, . . . ,mN ), (2) that a signed message mi (i ∈ [1, N ]) fulfills mi ≥ 18 and
(3) that, without revealing i, at least one of the signed messages mi fulfils mi ≥ 65.
For the sake of comparison, in Section G.1, for this example we describe a protocol
that does not use any mechanism to store information between prover and verifier, and a
protocol that uses a commitment scheme. In Section G.2, we describe a protocol that uses
FCD. The basic idea is that the protocol that does not store information between prover
and verifier needs to repeat the proof of signature possession computed for statement
(1) again for statements (2) and (3). The protocol that uses commitments does not need
to repeat the proof of signature possession because it stores the messages signed into
commitments, but requires an inefficient OR proof for statement (3). Finally the protocol
that uses FCD does not repeat the proof of signature possession and provides an efficient
OR proof for statement (3).
G.1 Protocols For OR Proofs without FCD
We compare our protocol to protocols that do not use FCD. First, we describe a protocol
that does not use commitments. Second, we show a protocol that uses a commitment
scheme CSetup, Com and VfCom.
Protocol that does not use commitments. The prover and the verifier use the functionali-
ties FR1ZK, FR2iZK (i ∈ [1, N ]) and FR3ZK, where the relations R1, R2i and R3 are defined as
follows.
R1 = {(wit1, ins1) : 1 = VfSig(pk , s, 〈m1, . . . ,mN 〉)}
with wit1 = (s,m1, . . . ,mN ) and ins1 = pk ,
R2i = {(wit2i, ins2i) : 1 = VfSig(pk , s, 〈m1, . . . ,mN 〉) ∧ mi ≥ 18}
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with wit2i = (s,m1, . . . ,mN ) and ins2i = pk (here we abstract away how mi ≥ 18 is
proven),
R3 ={(wit3, ins3) : 1 = VfSig(pk , s, 〈m1, . . . ,mN 〉) ∧
(m1 ≥ 65 ∨ . . . ∨ mN ≥ 65)}
with wit3 = (s,m1, . . . ,mN ) and ins3 = pk (here we abstract away how mi ≥ 65 is
proven).
In this case, because commitments are not used, relation R2i and relation R3 need to
repeat the proof of signature possession.
Protocol that uses commitments. By using the commitment scheme (CSetup, Com,
VfCom), the relations R1, R2i and R3 are defined as follows.
R1 ={(wit1, ins1) : 1 = VfSig(pk , s, 〈m1, . . . ,mN 〉) ∧
1 = VfCom(parc , com1,m1, open1) ∧ . . . ∧
1 = VfCom(parc , comN ,mN , openN )}
with witness wit1 = (s,m1, open1, . . . ,mN , openN ) and instance ins1 = (pk , parc ,
com1, . . . , comN ),
R2i = {(wit2i, ins2i) : 1 = VfCom(parc , comi,mi, openi) ∧ mi ≥ 18}
with wit2i = (mi, openi) and ins2i = (parc , comi) (here we abstract away how
mi ≥ 18 is proven),
R3 ={(wit3, ins3) : (1 = VfCom(parc , com1,m1, open1) ∧ m1 ≥ 65) ∨ . . . ∨
(1 = VfCom(parc , comN ,mN , openN ) ∧ mN ≥ 65)}
with wit3 = (m1, open1, . . . ,mN , openN ) and ins3 = (parc , com1, . . . , comN ) (here
we abstract away how mi ≥ 65 is proven).
The prover computes the commitments (com1, . . . , comN ). As can be seen, now the
size of wit2i does not grow with N , and thus constructions for FR2iZK (i ∈ [1, N ]) can be
more efficient. However, the cost of the proof for statement (3) grows with N .
G.2 Protocol For OR Proofs with FCD
The prover and the verifier use the functionalities FR1ZK, FR2iZK (i ∈ [1, N ]) and FR3ZK,
where the relations R1, R2i and R3 are defined as follows.
R1 ={(wit1, ins1) :
1 = VfSig(pk , s, 〈m1, . . . ,mN 〉) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom1,m1, copen1) ∧ . . . ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomN ,mN , copenN )} ,
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with wit1 = (s,m1, copen1, . . . ,mN , copenN ) and ins1 = (pk , cparcom, ccom1, . . . ,
ccomN ),
R2i = {(wit2i, ins2i) : 1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomi,mi, copeni) ∧ mi ≥ 18} ,
with wit2i = (mi, copeni) and ins2i = (cparcom, ccomi) (here we abstract away how
mi ≥ 18 is proven),
R3 ={(wit3, ins3) : 1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom,m, copen) ∧ m ≥ 65} ,
with wit3 = (m, copen) and ins3 = (cparcom, ccom) (here we abstract away how
mi ≥ 65 is proven). In relation R3, ccom is a commitment to a message m ∈
(m1, . . . ,mN ) that fulfills the statement m ≥ 65. The prover uses FCD to prove that the
message m committed in ccom belongs to (m1, . . . ,mN ).
Note that the size of neither wit2i nor wit3 grows with N . In the case of R3, this
is due to the use of FCD to read one message such that m ≥ 65. We recall that, in our
construction for FCD in Section D, the communication cost of a reading operation is
independent of the size of the table. We also note that, if the OR proof must be done over
a subset of the data in the table, e.g. [1, N ′] for N ′ < N , the size of wit3 does not grow
with N ′ either. In such a case, we would modify R3 as follows:
R3 = {(wit3, ins3) : 1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom,m, copen) ∧
m ≥ 65 ∧ 1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom ′, i, copen ′) ∧ i ∈ [1, N ′]} .
Here ccom ′ is a commitment to the position i where the message m is stored in the array
kept by FCD.
We describe how the protocols works. First, the prover P sets up FNIC and obtains
commitments (ccom1, . . . , ccomN ) to the messages (m1, . . . ,mN ) from FNIC.
P
(com.setup.ini, sid) - FNIC
(com.setup.end, sid,OK)ﬀ FNIC
(com.commit.ini, sid,m1) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom1, copen1)ﬀ FNIC
.
.
.
.
.
.
(com.commit.ini, sid,mN ) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccomN, copenN )ﬀ FNIC
To prove the first statement, the prover uses the functionality FR1ZK. The verifier V
uses FNIC to validate the commitments in the instance.
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P V
(zk.prove.ini, sid, wit1, ins1) - FR1
ZK
FR1
ZK
(zk.prove.end, sid, ins1) -
FNIC
(com.validate.ini, sid, ccom1)ﬀ
FNIC
(com.validate.end, sid, b1) -
.
.
.
.
.
.
FNIC
(com.validate.ini, sid, ccomN )ﬀ
FNIC
(com.validate.end, sid, bN ) -
After that, the prover writes the messages (m1, . . . ,mN ) into the table Tblcd of FCD.
For this purpose, the prover obtains from FNIC commitments to the positions [1, N ].
FCD is parameterized by Nmax = N and Uv , which is set to the message space of the
signature scheme.
P V
(com.commit.ini, sid, 1) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom′1, copen
′
1)ﬀ FNIC
.
.
.
.
.
.
(com.commit.ini, sid, N) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom′N, copen
′
N )ﬀ FNIC
(cd.write.ini, sid, ccom′1, 1, copen
′
1, ccom1,m1, copen1)- FCD
FCD
(cd.write.end, sid, ccom′1, ccom1)-
.
.
.
.
.
.
(cd.write.ini, sid, ccom′N,N, copen
′
N, ccomN,mN, copenN )- FCD
FCD
(cd.write.end, sid, ccom′N, ccomN )-
The prover must then disclose the opening of the commitments to the positions
(ccom ′1, . . . , ccom
′
N ) to the verifier, e.g. by using functionality FSMT in Section C.5.
After that, the verifier verifies the openings by using FNIC.
P V
(smt.send.ini, sid, 〈copen′1, . . . , copen
′
N 〉)- FSMT
FSMT
(smt.send.end, sid, 〈copen′1, . . . , copen
′
N 〉)-
FNIC
(com.verify.ini, sid, ccom′1, 1, copen
′
1)ﬀ
FNIC
(com.verify.end, sid, b1) -
.
.
.
.
.
.
FNIC
(com.verify.ini, sid, ccom′N,N, copen
′
N )ﬀ
FNIC
(com.verify.end, sid, bN ) -
To prove the second and the third statements, the prover uses the functionalities
FR2iZK (i ∈ [1, N ]) and FR3ZK. For the case of R3, the prover chooses an index i ∈ [1, N ]
such that mi ≥ 65. The prover then obtains a commitment ccom ′ to i and a commitment
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ccom to mi from FNIC. The prover uses FCD to prove that there is an entry [i,mi] stored
in state. Finally, the prover sets wit3 = (mi, copen) and ins3 = (cparcom, ccom) and
uses FR3ZK to prove that mi ≥ 65.
P V
(com.commit.ini, sid, i) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom′, copen′)ﬀ FNIC
(com.commit.ini, sid,mi) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom, copen)ﬀ FNIC
(cd.read.ini, sid, ccom′, i, copen′, ccom,mi, copen)- FCD
FCD (cd.read.end, sid, ccom
′
, ccom) -
FNIC (com.validate.ini, sid, ccom
′
)ﬀ
FNIC (com.validate.end, sid, b
′
) -
FNIC (com.validate.ini, sid, ccom)ﬀ
FNIC (com.validate.end, sid, b) -
(zk.prove.ini, sid, wit3, ins3) - FR3
ZK
FR3
ZK
(zk.prove.end, sid, ins3) -
H Zero-Knowledge Counting
We describe another example of how to use FCD as a building block of more complex
protocols. Concretely, we show how FCD can be used to build protocols for a task we
refer to as “zero-knowledge counting”, which roughly speaking is about counting the
number of times a witness is used in the computation of different ZK proofs.
Zero-knowledge counting is a task parameterized by a relation R. For the possible
witness values wit such that, for any instance ins , (wit , ins) ∈ R, zero-knowledge
counting consists in counting how many times each witness value wit was used by
the prover. We define an ideal functionality for zero-knowledge counting that stores
one counter for each possible witness value. When the prover sends (wit , ins) ∈ R,
the functionality increments the counter for the witness value wit . At this stage, no
information about the witness used is revealed to the verifier, but later the functionality
allows the prover to disclose to the verifier the value of the counter for a given witness.
We construct zero-knowledge counting by using FCD as a building block. Basically, the
array stored by FCD stores the counters for each of the witness values. Each position in
the array is associated with one of the witness values.
We describe practical applications of zero-knowledge counting in Section H.1. In
Section H.2, we describe the ideal functionality for zero-knowledge counting. In Sec-
tion H.3, we describe the construction that realizes that functionality by using FCD as a
building block. We analyze the security of our construction in Section H.4.
H.1 Applications of Zero-Knowledge Counting
In many privacy-preserving protocols, users use zero-knowledge proofs to prove to a
service provider that they are entitled to receive a service. Typically, those protocols
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minimize the disclosure of user sensitive data to the service provider. Still, service
providers are usually interested in collecting aggregate data about a user’s behavior.
Zero-knowledge counting (ZKC) is useful for the collection of aggregate data about
users. ZKC allows the service provider to obtain information on the number of times a
witness was used by the user in order to get access to a service, which may reveal useful
information about the user. We describe two applications of ZKC to privacy-preserving
location-sharing services and to privacy-preserving e-commerce.
Privacy-Preserving Location-Sharing Services. In location-sharing services, a user
checks-in at a venue (e.g., a restaurant or shop) and reports her location to the service
provider. The service provider sends the user’s location to the user’s registered friends.
In a privacy-preserving location-sharing service, a user encrypts her location and
sends it to the service provider [25]. The service provider forwards the encrypted location
to the user’s registered friends, but does not learn the location himself. Still, the service
provider requires the user to prove in zero-knowledge that the encrypted location is a
venue registered with the service provider. There are different ways this zero-knowledge
proof can be computed. For example, the service provider can issue a list of signatures
where each signature signs a registered venue. The user then picks the signature that
signs the venue where she checks-in and proves in zero-knowledge that the encrypted
message equals a message signed by the service provider.
In this setting, ZKC can be used to allow the service provider to obtain aggregate
information about the venues where the user checks-in. Each time a user checks-in at a
venue, the user uses the identifier of the venue as witness in the zero-knowledge proof.
By using ZKC, the protocol can be augmented to count the number of times each of the
venues’ identifiers is used as witness by the user, and to eventually reveal to the service
provider aggregate data about the venues where the user checks-in. This could be used
by users, e.g., to obtain discounts at venues where they have checked-in a certain number
of times. We remark that this application of ZKC is possible thanks to the fact that, when
a counter is incremented, ZKC hides from the verifier both the counter value and the
witness associated to that counter.
Privacy-Preserving E-Commerce. Priced oblivious transfer (POT) is a protocol be-
tween a seller and a buyer. The seller sells messages (m1, . . . ,mN ). The prices of the
messages are (p1, . . . , pN ). At each purchase, the buyer chooses σ ∈ [1, N ] and obtains
message mσ. The seller does not learn any information about σ, but is guaranteed that
the buyer pays the correct price pσ and that the buyer does not learn any information
about messages different from mσ. Some constructions of POT use zero-knowledge
proofs as building block [43, 5]. At each purchase, a buyer uses σ as witness in order to
prove in zero-knowledge that she purchases message mσ and pays the price pσ .
POT can be applied to e-commerce of digital goods. For example, POT can be applied
to construct a privacy-preserving conditional access system (CAS) for pay-per-view
TV. In such a CAS, the TV provider acts as the seller. The TV provider sets messages
(m1, . . . ,mN ) to the keys that users need in order to decrypt the TV program being
broadcast in each of the N TV channels. Keys are updated for each TV program and thus
users need to purchase a new key to decrypt each TV program broadcast in a channel.
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In this setting, ZKC can be used to allow the TV provider to obtain aggregate
information about the TV channels of interest for the user, without the TV provider
learning the concrete TV programs purchased by the user. By using ZKC, the POT
protocol can be augmented to count the number of times the user buys a key for each of
the TV channels, and to eventually reveal the counter values to the provider. We remark
again that this application of ZKC is possible thanks to the fact that, when a counter is
incremented, both the counter value and the corresponding witness are hidden from the
verifier.
H.2 Ideal Functionality FRZKC for Zero-Knowledge Counting
Let R be a polynomial time computable binary relation. For tuples (wit , ins) ∈ R we
call wit the witness and ins the instance. Let L be the NP-language consisting of the
instances ins for which there exist witnesses wit such that (wit , ins) ∈ R.
We consider relations R such that, for all instances ins ∈ L, the valid witnesses
(wit1, . . . ,witN ) belong to a finite list S of size N . We define zero-knowledge counting
as the task of both proving knowledge of a witness wit such that (wit , ins) ∈ R (as
in the functionality for zero-knowledge described in Section C.3), and of counting the
number of times each of the witnesses (wit1, . . . ,witN ) was used. For simplicity, our
functionality FRZKC considers relations where each witness is treated as a single element.
If a witness consists of a tuple of elements, and the values of those elements belong to a
finite list, it is possible to define and realize a more involved functionality that stores one
counter for each of the elements in the witness.
Our functionality FRZKC interacts with a prover P and a verifier V . FRZKC is parame-
terized by a relation R, which describes the list of possible witnesses (wit1, . . . ,witN ).
FRZKC maintains a table Tbl. Tbl contains N entries of the form [wit i , ct i ] (i ∈ [1,N ]),
where wit i ∈ S is a possible witness value and ct i is a counter that stores the number of
times that the prover used the witness value wit i .
The prover P proves to the verifier V knowledge of a witness value wit i such that,
for an instance ins , (wit i , ins) ∈ R. The prover P can also reveal to the verifier V the
number ct i of times that a witness value wit i was used. We note that it is possible to
define more involved functionalities where the prover P , instead of revealing ct i , proves
e.g. that ct i belongs to an interval, or, in general, proves in zero-knowledge any statistic
about the counters stored in Tbl.
The interaction between the functionality FRZKC, the prover P and the verifier V
takes place through the following interfaces.
1. The verifier V uses the zkc.setup interface to initialize to 0 the counters in the table
Tbl.
2. The prover P uses the zkc.prove interface to prove to the verifier V knowledge of a
witness value wit i such that, for an instance ins , (wit i , ins) ∈ R. This interface is
similar to the zk.prove interface of the functionality FRZK described in Section C.3.
The main difference is that now the FRZKC updates a counter of the number of times
that the witness wit i is used.
3. The prover P uses the zkc.count interface to reveal to the verifier V that the witness
value wit i was used ct i times.
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Description of FRZKC. FRZKC is parameterized by a description of a relation R, which
describes the list of possible witnesses (wit1, . . . ,witN ), and by an upper bound ctmax
on the number of times a witness value wit i (i ∈ [1,N ]) can be used. FRZKC interacts
with a prover P and a verifier V .
1. On input (zkc.setup.ini, sid) from V:
– Abort if sid /∈ (P,V, sid ′) or if (sid , cv) is already stored.
– Initialize a counter cv ← 0 for the verifier and store (sid , cv).
– Send (zkc.setup.sim, sid) to S.
S. On input (zkc.setup.rep, sid) from S:
– Abort if (sid , cv) is not stored, or if (sid ,Tbl, cp) is already stored.
– Initialize an empty table Tbl with entries [wit i , 0] for i = 1 to N .
– Initialize a counter cp ← 0 for the prover and store (sid ,Tbl, cp).
– Send (zkc.setup.end, sid) to P .
2. On input (zkc.prove.ini, sid ,wit i , ins) from P:
– Abort if (sid ,Tbl, cp) is not stored or if (wit i , ins) /∈ R.
– Retrieve the entry [wit i , ct i ] in Tbl. Set ct ′i ← ct i + 1. If ct ′i > ctmax , abort,
else store [wit i , ct ′i ] in Tbl.
– Increment the counter cp in (sid ,Tbl, cp).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ins, cp).
– Send (zkc.prove.sim, sid , qid , ins) to S.
S. On input (zkc.prove.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ins, cp′) is not stored, or if cp′ 6= cv + 1, where cv is stored in
(sid , cv).
– Increment the counter cv in (sid , cv).
– Delete the record (qid , ins, cp′).
– Send (zkc.prove.end, sid , ins) to V .
3. On input (zkc.count.ini, sid ,wit i) from P:
– Abort if (sid ,Tbl, cp) is not stored or if wit i /∈ (wit1, . . . ,witN ).
– Retrieve the entry [wit i , ct i ] in Tbl, create a fresh qid and store (qid ,wit i , ct i ,
cp).
– Send (zkc.count.sim, sid , qid) to S .
S. On input (zkc.count.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid ,wit i , ct ′i , cp′) is not stored or if cp′ 6= cv , where cv is stored in
(sid , cv).
– Delete the record (qid ,wit i , ct ′i , cp′).
– Send (zkc.count.end, sid ,wit i , ct ′i) to V .
H.3 Construction ΠRZKC for Zero-Knowledge Counting
We propose a construction ΠRZKC that realizes the ideal functionality FRZKC described in
Section H.2. We describe our construction ΠRZKC as a hybrid protocol that uses several
ideal functionalities as building blocks. Thanks to that, the security analysis is simpler
and the construction allows for multiple instantiations obtained via replacing the ideal
functionalities by protocols that realized them.
Our construction uses the functionality FCD for a committed database described
in Section 3, which is used to store the number of times each of the witnesses (wit1,
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. . . ,witN ) is used. It also uses the functionality FNIC for non-interactive commitments
described in Section C.4 and the functionality FSMT for secure message transmission
described in Section C.5. Additionally, it uses the functionality FRcZK for zero-knowledge
described in Section C.3.
Let f : S → [1,N ] be a bijective function that maps each possible witness
(wit1, . . . ,witN ) to an array position. The relation Rc, which extends the relation R, is
defined as follows:
Rc ={(witc, insc) :
(wit i, ins) ∈ R ∧ (26)
i = f(wit i) ∧ (27)
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom, i , copen) ∧ (28)
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom1, v1, copen1) ∧ (29)
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccom2, v2, copen2) ∧ (30)
v2 = v1 + 1 ∧ v2 ∈ [0, ctmax ]} (31)
where the witness witc is (wit i , i , copen, v1, copen1, v2, copen2) and the instance insc
is (ins, cparcom, ccom, ccom1, ccom2, cp). Equation 26 corresponds to the relation
R. Equation 27 maps the witness value wit i to a value i ∈ [1,N ]. In equation 28,
equation 29 and equation 30, the prover proves that ccom , ccom1 and ccom2 are com-
mitments to i , v1 and v2 respectively. In equation 31, the prover proves that v2 increments
v1.
By using FRcZK, the prover proves to the verifier that he knows a witness wit i such
that (wit i, ins) ∈ R. Additionally, the prover computes commitments to the position
i and to two values v1 and v2 such that v2 = v1 + 1 and proves that the function f
associates the position i with the witness wit i . These commitments will be sent as input
to the functionality FCD. The position i indicates the position in the array of FCD, the
value v1 is the old value of the counter of the number of times wit i was used by the
prover, and the value v2 is the new value of that counter.
We describe below the construction ΠRZKC. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, we show the
message flow for the zkc.prove and zkc.count interfaces respectively. We recall that the
functionality FRZKC is parameterized by a description of a relation R, which describes
the list of possible witnesses (wit1, . . . ,witN ), and by an upper bound ctmax on the
number of times a witness value wit i (i ∈ [1,N ]) can be used.
Description of ΠRZKC. Π
R
ZKC uses FCD, which is parameterized by a universe of state
values Uv = [0, ctmax ] and by a maximum state size Nmax = N . It also uses the
functionality FNIC for non-interactive commitments, the functionality FRcZK for zero-
knowledge and the functionality FSMT for secure message transmission.
1. On input (zkc.setup.ini, sid), V and P do the following:
– V aborts if sid /∈ (P,V, sid ′) or if (sid , cv) is already stored.
– V initializes a counter cv ← 0 and stores (sid , cv).
– V sends (com.setup.ini, sid) to FNIC and receives (com.setup.end, sid ,OK )
from FNIC.
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– V initializes a table Tbl with entries [wit i , 0] for i = 1 to N , and sends
(cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tbl) to FCD.
– P receives (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tbl) from FCD.
– P aborts if Tbl does not consist of entries [wit i , 0] for i = 1 to N .
– P sends (com.setup.ini, sid) to FNIC and receives (com.setup.end, sid ,OK )
from FNIC.
– P initializes a counter cp ← 0 and stores (sid ,Tbl, cp).
– P outputs (zkc.setup.end, sid).
2. On input (zkc.prove.ini, sid ,wit i , ins), P and V do the following:
– P aborts if (sid ,Tbl, cp) is not stored or if (wit i , ins) /∈ R.
– P increments the counter cp in (sid ,Tbl, cp).
– P retrieves the bijective function f in Rc and computes i ← f(wit i). P sends
(com.commit.ini, sid , i) to FNIC and receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccom,
copen) from FNIC.
– P retrieves the entry [wit i , ct i ] in Tbl and sets v1 ← ct i and v2 ← ct i +
1. P aborts if v2 > ctmax . Else, P sends (com.commit.ini, sid , v1) to FNIC
and receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccom1, copen1) from FNIC. P sends the
message (com.commit.ini, sid , v2) to FNIC and receives (com.commit.end,
sid , ccom2, copen2) from FNIC.
– P sets witc ← (wit i , i , copen, v1, copen1, v2, copen2).
– P parses ccom as (ccom ′, cparcom,COM.Verify).
– P parses ccom1 as (ccom ′1, cparcom1,COM.Verify1).
– P parses ccom2 as (ccom ′2, cparcom2,COM.Verify2).
– P sets insc ← (ins, cparcom, ccom ′, ccom ′1, ccom ′2, cp).
– P stores (cp,witc, insc, read).
– P sends (zk.prove.ini, sid ,witc, insc) to FRcZK.
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sid , insc) from FRcZK.
– V parses insc as (ins, cparcom, ccom ′, ccom ′1, ccom ′2, cp).
– V aborts if cp 6= cv + 1 or if there exists ins ′c already stored.
– V sets ccom ← (ccom ′, cparcom,COM.Verify), ccom1 ← (ccom ′1, cparcom,
COM.Verify) and ccom2 ← (ccom ′2, cparcom,COM.Verify). (COM.Verify is
part of the description of the relation Rc.)
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccom) toFNIC and receives (com.validate.end,
sid , b) fromFNIC. V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccom1) toFNIC and receives
(com.validate.end, sid , b1) from FNIC. V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccom2)
to FNIC and receives (com.validate.end, sid , b2) from FNIC. If b = b1 = b2 =
1 is not fulfilled, V aborts.
– V stores insc.
– V sets sidSMT ← (V,P, sid ′) and sends (smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈cp, read〉) to
FSMT.
– P receives (smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈cp, read〉) from FSMT.
– P aborts if (cp,witc, insc, read) is not stored.
– P parses insc as (ins, cparcom, ccom ′, ccom ′1, ccom ′2, cp).
– P parses witc as (wit i , i , copen, v1, copen1, v2, copen2).
– P sets ccom ← (ccom ′, cparcom,COM.Verify), ccom1 ← (ccom ′1, cparcom,
COM.Verify) and ccom2 ← (ccom ′2, cparcom,COM.Verify). (COM.Verify is
part of the description of the relation Rc.)
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– P replaces (cp,witc, insc, read) by (cp,witc, insc,write).
– P sends (cd.read.ini, sid , ccom, i , copen, ccom1, v1, copen1) to FCD.
– V receives (cd.read.end, sid , ccom, ccom1) from FCD.
– V aborts if insc is not stored.
– V parses insc as (ins, cparcom, ccom ′, ccom ′1, ccom ′2, cp).
– V compares the commitments received from FCD with those in insc. If they are
not equal, V aborts.
– V sets sidSMT ← (V,P, sid ′) and sends (smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈cp,write〉) to
FSMT.
– P receives (smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈cp,write〉) from FSMT.
– P aborts if (cp,witc, insc,write) is not stored.
– P parses insc as (ins, cparcom, ccom ′, ccom ′1, ccom ′2, cp).
– P parses witc as (wit i , i , copen, v1, copen1, v2, copen2).
– P deletes the record (cp,witc, insc,write).
– P sends (cd.write.ini, sid , ccom, i , copen, ccom2, v2, copen2) to FCD.
– V receives (cd.write.end, sid , ccom, ccom2) from FCD.
– V aborts if insc is not stored.
– V parses insc as (ins, cparcom, ccom ′, ccom ′1, ccom ′2, cp).
– V compares the commitments received from FCD with those in insc. If they are
not equal, V aborts.
– V increments cv in (sid , cv) and deletes the record insc.
– V outputs (zkc.prove.end, sid , ins).
3. On input (zkc.count.ini, sid ,wit i), P and V do the following:
– P aborts if (sid ,Tbl, cp) is not stored or if wit i /∈ (wit1, . . . ,witN ).
– P retrieves the bijective function f in Rc and computes i ← f(wit i). P sends
(com.commit.ini, sid , i) to FNIC and receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccom,
copen) from FNIC.
– P retrieves the entry [wit i , ct i ] in Tbl and sets v1 ← ct i . P sends the message
(com.commit.ini, sid , v1) toFNIC and receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccom1,
copen1) from FNIC.
– P stores (ccom, i , copen, ccom1, v1, copen1).
– P sends (cd.read.ini, sid , ccom, i , copen, ccom1, v1, copen1) to FCD.
– V receives (cd.read.end, sid , ccom, ccom1) from FCD.
– V stores (ccom, ccom1).
– V sets sidSMT ← (V,P, sid ′) and sends the message (smt.send.ini, sidSMT,
〈ccom, ccom1〉) to FSMT.
– P receives (smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈ccom, ccom1〉) from FSMT.
– P aborts if (ccom ′, i , copen, ccom ′1, v1, copen1) such that ccom ′ = ccom and
ccom ′1 = ccom1 is not stored.
– P deletes the record (ccom, i , copen, ccom1, v1, copen1).
– P sends (smt.send.ini, sid , 〈ccom, i , copen, ccom1, v1, copen1〉) to FSMT.
– V receives (smt.send.end, sid , 〈ccom, i , copen, ccom1, v1, copen1〉) from the
functionality FSMT.
– V aborts if (ccom ′, ccom ′1) such that ccom ′ = ccom and ccom ′1 = ccom1 is
not stored.
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– V sends (com.verify.ini, sid , ccom, i , copen) to FNIC and receives the message
(com.verify.end, sid , b) from FNIC. V sends the message (com.verify.ini, sid ,
ccom, v1, copen1) to FNIC and receives (com.verify.end, sid , b1) from FNIC.
If b = b1 = 1 is not fulfilled, V aborts.
– V uses the inverse function of f to compute the witness value wit i associated
with i .
– V deletes the record (ccom, ccom1).
– V outputs (zkc.count.end, sid ,wit i , v1).
Theorem 9. The construction ΠRZKC securely realizes FRZKC in the FCD, FRcZK, FSMT,
and FNIC-hybrid model.
We analyze the security of ΠRZKC in Section H.4.
P V
(com.commit.ini, sid, i) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom, copen)ﬀ FNIC
(com.commit.ini, sid, v1) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom1, copen1)ﬀ FNIC
(com.commit.ini, sid, v2) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom2, copen2)ﬀ FNIC
(zk.prove.ini, sid, witc, insc) - FRc
ZK
FRc
ZK
(zk.prove.end, sid, insc) -
FNIC (com.validate.ini, sid, ccom)ﬀ
FNIC (com.validate.end, sid, b) -
FNIC
(com.validate.ini, sid, ccom1)ﬀ
FNIC
(com.validate.end, sid, b1) -
FNIC
(com.validate.ini, sid, ccom2)ﬀ
FNIC
(com.validate.end, sid, b2) -
FSMT
(smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈cp, read〉)ﬀ
(smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈cp, read〉)ﬀ FSMT
(cd.read.ini, sid, ccom, i, copen, ccom1, v1, copen1)- FCD
FCD
(cd.read.end, sid, ccom, ccom1) -
FSMT
(smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈cp, write〉)ﬀ
(smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈cp, write〉)ﬀ FSMT
(cd.write.ini, sid, ccom, i, copen, ccom2, v2, copen2)- FCD
FCD
(cd.write.end, sid, ccom, ccom2) -
Fig. 1. Construction ΠRZKC: interface zkc.prove.
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P V
(com.commit.ini, sid, i) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom, copen)ﬀ FNIC
(com.commit.ini, sid, v1) - FNIC
(com.commit.end, sid, ccom1, copen1)ﬀ FNIC
(cd.read.ini, sid, ccom, i, copen, ccom1, v1, copen1)- FCD
FCD
(cd.read.end, sid, ccom, ccom1) -
FSMT
(smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈ccom, ccom1〉)ﬀ
(smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈ccom, ccom1〉)ﬀ FSMT
(smt.send.ini, sid, 〈ccom, i, copen, ccom1, v1, copen1〉)- FSMT
FSMT
(smt.send.end, sid, 〈ccom, i, copen, ccom1, v1, copen1〉)-
FNIC (com.verify.ini, sid, ccom, i, copen)ﬀ
FNIC (com.verify.end, sid, b) -
FNIC
(com.verify.ini, sid, ccom, v1, copen1)ﬀ
FNIC
(com.verify.end, sid, b1) -
Fig. 2. Construction ΠRZKC: interface zkc.count.
H.4 Security Analysis of Construction ΠRZKC
Theorem 10. The construction ΠRZKC securely realizes FRZKC in the FCD, FRcZK, FSMT,
and FNIC-hybrid model.
To prove that our construction ΠRZKC securely realizes the ideal functionality FRZKC,
we have to show that for any environment Z and any adversaryA there exists a simulator
S such that Z cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with A and the protocol in the
real world or with S and FRZKC. The simulator thereby plays the role of all honest parties
in the real world and interacts with FRZKC for all corrupt parties in the ideal world.
Our simulator S runs copies of the functionalities FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC.
When any of the copies of those functionalities aborts, S implicitly forwards the abortion
message to the adversary if the functionality sends the abortion message to a corrupt
party.
Security Analysis of Construction ΠRZKC when P is Corrupt. We describe the
simulator S for the case in which the prover is corrupt. Basically, S simulates the
protocol by running copies of the ideal functionalities and of protocol ΠRZKC for the
verifier.
– S initializes an empty table Tbl with entries [wit i , 0] for i = 1 to N .
– When receiving a message from A, S uses the first field of the message to associate
the message to one of the ideal functionalities FCD, FRcZK, FSMT or FNIC and runs
a copy of the corresponding functionality on input that message.
– When the copy of any of the functionalities FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC sends a
message to the prover or to the simulator, S forwards the output of the functionality
to A.
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– When the copy of any of the functionalities FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC sends a
message to the verifier, the simulator runs protocol ΠRZKC for the verifier on input
that message.
– When protocol ΠRZKC for the verifier sends a message to any of the functionalities
FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC, S runs the copy of the respective functionality on
input that message.
– When protocol ΠRZKC for the verifier outputs the message (zkc.prove.end, sid , ins),
S retrieves the message (zk.prove.ini, sid ,witc, insc) sent by A such that ins ∈
insc. S parses witc as (wit i , i , copen, v1, copen1, v2, copen2). S increments the
counter in the entry in Tbl that corresponds to wit i and sends (zkc.prove.ini, sid ,
wit i , ins) to FRZKC. When FRZKC sends (zkc.prove.sim, sid , qid , ins) to S , S sends
(zkc.prove.rep, sid , qid) to FRZKC.
– When protocol ΠRZKC for the verifier outputs the message (zkc.count.end, sid ,wit i ,
v1), S checks that there is an entry [wit i , v1] in Tbl. If the entry does not exist, S
outputs failure. Otherwise, S sends (zkc.count.ini, sid ,wit i) to FRZKC. When FRZKC
sends (zkc.count.sim, sid , qid) to S, S sends (zkc.count.rep, sid , qid) to FRZKC.
– When protocol ΠRZKC for the verifier outputs an abortion message, S picks a random
qid and sends (zkc.count.rep, sid , qid) to FRZKC, so that FRZKC sends an abortion
message to the dummy verifier.
Theorem 11. When the prover P is corrupt, the construction ΠRZKC securely realizes
FRZKC in the FCD, FRcZK, FSMT, and FNIC-hybrid model.
Proof Sketch. Our simulator S is indistinguishable from the real world protocol because
it runs as the real-world protocol, except when it outputs failure. The probability that S
outputs failure is negligible thanks to the security properties ensured by the functionalities
FCD, FRcZK, FSMT, and FNIC. Concretely, FNIC ensures that commitments are binding.
FRcZK ensures that the witness witc and instance insc given by the prover satisfy the
relation Rc. The relation Rc guarantees that the prover knows a witness wit i and an
instance ins that satisfy the relation R. Additionally, it associates wit i with a position i
committed to in ccom and it shows that two commitments ccom1 and ccom2 commit to
values v1 and v2 such that v2 increments v1. FCD ensures that ccom and ccom1 commit
a position i and a value v1 that was previously stored, and that ccom2 commits to the
new value v2 that is stored at position i .
Security Analysis of Construction ΠRZKC when V is Corrupt. We describe the
simulator S for the case in which the verifier is corrupt. Basically, S simulates the
protocol by running copies of the ideal functionalities and of protocol ΠRZKC for the
prover. In contrast to the case of a corrupt prover, we need to modify ΠRZKC and the code
of the ideal functionalities in several ways, which we detail below.
– When FRZKC sends a message (zkc.prove.sim, sid , qid , ins), S sends the message
(zkc.prove.rep, sid , qid) to FRZKC.
– When FRZKC sends a message (zkc.count.sim, sid , qid), S sends (zkc.count.rep,
sid , qid) to FRZKC.
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– When FRZKC sends a message (zkc.prove.end, sid , ins), S runs the protocol ΠRZKC
for the prover on input (zkc.prove.ini, sid ,⊥, ins). The difference with respect to
the real world protocol is that wit i is replaced by ⊥, and that the elements (i , v1,
v2) to set the witness witc are taken randomly.
– When FRZKC sends a message (zkc.count.end, sid ,wit i , ct ′i), S runs the protocol
ΠRZKC for the prover on that input.
– When the protocol ΠRZKC sends a message to any of the ideal functionalities FCD,
FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC, S runs the copy of the respective functionality on input that
message. In the code of FRcZK, the check (witc, insc) ∈ Rc is removed. In the code
of FCD, the check [i , v1] ∈ Tbl is removed.
– When the copy of any of the functionalities FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC sends a
message to the verifier or to the simulator, S forwards the output of the functionality
to A.
– When the copy of any of the functionalities FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC sends a
message to the prover, the simulator runs protocol ΠRZKC for the prover on input that
message.
– When receiving a message from A, our simulator runs a copy of the corresponding
functionality FCD, FRcZK, FSMT and FNIC on input that message.
Theorem 12. When the verifier V is corrupt, the construction ΠRZKC securely realizes
FRZKC in the FCD, FRcZK, FSMT, and FNIC-hybrid model.
Proof Sketch. We show that our simulator S is indistinguishable from the real-world
protocol. S replaces wit i by ⊥ and (i , v1, v2) by random values in the correct domains.
However, A never receives any information about those values. The simulator also
removes the checks (witc, insc) ∈ Rc in the code of FRcZK and [i , v1] ∈ Tbl in the code
of FCD. However, the commitments ccom , ccom1 and ccom2 and the instance insc are
indistinguishable from the real-world ones, and the correct values wit i and ct ′i are used
when they are revealed by FRZKC.
I Related Work
Commitments and ZK proofs of shuffles. Many protocols (e.g. [12, 9, 43]) use commit-
ment schemes to maintain a database between a prover P and a verifier V . However,
commitments on their own are not adequate to realize FCD because they do not allow P
to hide the positions read from or written into the database. ZK proofs of shuffles [17]
can be used to shuffle the commitments in order to hide the positions read or written. A
construction using commitments along with proofs of shuffles could realize FCD, but
less efficiently than a construction based on vector commitments.
Accumulators. A cryptographic accumulator [3] allows one to represent a set X suc-
cinctly as a single accumulator value A. It also provides a method to prove succinctly
that an element x belongs to X to any party that holds A. This method consists in
computing a witness W whose size is independent of the size |X| of the set. Soundness
(or collision-freeness) guarantees that it is infeasible to prove that x ∈ X if x /∈ X .
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Since their introduction, a number of accumulator schemes have been proposed
(see [19] for a comprehensive review). Some accumulator schemes are trapdoorless, i.e.,
the party that generates the parameters of the scheme does not learn any trapdoor [40,
44, 4, 35]. However, most practical accumulator schemes use a trusted setup [10, 2, 39, 7,
19, 22]. In the following, we will discuss schemes that use a trusted setup.
Extensions to accumulator schemes include schemes that support non-membership
witnesses [31, 2, 22], i.e. schemes where it is possible to compute a prove that x /∈ X ,
which are referred to as universal. Some schemes, referred to as dynamic, allow efficient
updates [10, 2, 7], i.e. the accumulator value A can be updated to add or remove elements
from the accumulated set with cost independent of |X|, and witnesses can also be updated
with cost independent of |X|. For many applications of accumulators, e.g. revocation of
anonymous credentials, accumulator schemes are extended with zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge of witnesses to prove (non-)membership.
Most accumulator schemes do not hide the accumulated set, i.e., the value A does
not hide the accumulated set X . Recently, an indistinguishability definition [19] and
a simulation-based definition [22] of the property of hiding the accumulated set were
proposed. The definition in [22], referred to as zero-knowledge accumulators, is stronger.
The main difference is that, in [19], the updates to the accumulated set are not guaranteed
to be hidden, while in [22] this is guaranteed. The reason is that, in [19], although A is
computed initially through a randomized algorithm, subsequent updates are computed
deterministically, whereas in [22] both the initial computation of A and subsequent
updates are computed with randomized algorithms.
Our construction for a committed database uses a vector commitment scheme with
efficient updates. The main difference between vector commitments and accumulators
is that, while accumulators allow for committing to a set, vector commitments allow
for committing to a vector of messages, where each message is committed at a specific
position. This allows the construction of an updatable committed database where it is
also possible to prove statements about the position where a message is written or read.
The vector commitment scheme with efficient updates that we use provides ran-
domized algorithms both to compute a vector commitment and to update it. This idea
resembles the construction of zero-knowledge accumulators in [22]. Our definition of the
hiding property for a vector commitment with updates requires that an updated vector
commitment cannot be distinguished from a freshly generated one. We note that, in our
construction for a committed database, the prover never reveals commitment openings
(or witnesses) to the verifier, and thus we do not require a hiding property that involves
commitment openings. Nevertheless, we think that the vector commitment scheme with
efficient updates that we use could fulfill a simulation-based definition of the hiding
property akin to the zero-knowledge definition for accumulators provided in [22].
We use an instantiation of a vector commitment scheme with efficient updates
based on the Diffie-Hellman exponent (DHE) assumption. This instantiation resembles
the accumulator scheme in [7]. The scheme in [19] and in [22] extend the scheme
in [39], which is based on the strong bilinear Diffie-Hellman (SBDH) assumption. (In
the paragraph about vector commitments, we explain why we choose a scheme based on
DHE.) We think that the techniques to re-randomize commitments and witnesses used to
construct the vector commitment with efficient updates based on DHE can be applied
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to extend the accumulator scheme [7] in order to obtain a zero-knowledge accumulator
based on DHE.
Vector Commitments. Vector commitments [34, 14] allow a committer to commit to a
vector of values. Subsequently, the committer is able to open the commitment to a vector
component. Both the size of the commitment and the size of an opening are independent
of the length of the committed vector.
Vector commitments (VC) are defined in [14]. This definition is for non-hiding vector
commitments with updates. To obtain hiding vector commitments, it is suggested to
compose a non-hiding vector commitment scheme with a standard commitment scheme.
Two constructions of non-hiding vector commitments are given based on the CDH and
RSA assumptions. In [34], a construction of mercurial vector commitments based on
the Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DHE) assumption is proposed. This construction leads to
constructions of non-hiding and hiding vector commitments based on DHE, which were
used in, e.g., [32, 27, 30].
Our committed database uses as building block any hiding vector commitment
scheme with updates, along with zero-knowledge proofs that a vector component is
being read or written. To instantiate our committed database, we use a construction
of hiding vector commitments with updates based on the DHE assumption along with
the corresponding zero-knowledge proofs for reading and writing. In this construction,
the size of the public parameters is linear in the maximum vector length, and updates
of commitments and of openings can be computed with cost linear in the number of
updated elements but independent of the vector length. In comparison, in a hiding
VC construction from CDH, the size of the public parameters would be quadratic (the
advantage would be to use a more standard assumption).
Polynomial and functional commitments. Polynomial commitments allow a committer
to commit to a polynomial and open the commitment to an evaluation of the polynomial.
They can be used as vector commitments by committing to a polynomial that interpolates
the vector to be committed. In [28], a construction of polynomial commitments from the
SDH assumption is proposed, which has the disadvantage that efficient updates cannot
be computed without knowledge of the trapdoor. A further generalization of vector
commitments and polynomial commitments are functional commitments [33].
Zero-Knowledge Data Structures. Zero-Knowledge Sets (ZKS) [37] allow a prover P
to commit to a set X and to subsequently prove to a verifier V (non-)membership of
an element x in X . Zero-Knowledge Databases (ZKDB) are similar to ZKS but each
element x ∈ X is associated with a value v, in such a way that a proof that x ∈ X
reveals v to V . Both ZKS and ZKDB are two-party protocols between P and V . Security
for V requires that an adversarial P is not able to prove x ∈ X if x /∈ X (and vice
versa), while zero-knowledge requires that proofs of (non-)membership reveal nothing
else beyond (non-)membership, not even the size of the set.
Zero-knowledge sets were introduced in [37]. In [16], ZKS were constructed from
trapdoor mercurial commitments and collision resistant hash functions. In [13], it was
shown that (trapdoor) mercurial commitments can be constructed from one-way func-
tions. These ZKS constructions use variants of Merkle trees where nodes are filled with
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mercurial commitments to their children. Because of the need to hide any information
on the size of X , the depth k of the tree, which determines an upper bound on the size
of the committable set, must fulfill 2k >> |X|. As a consequence, constructions are
inefficient because proves of (non-)membership grow linearly with the tree depth.
ZKS with short proofs for membership were proposed in [15], while short proofs
for membership and non-membership are attained in [34]. The latter ZKS construction
is the one based on mercurial vector commitments from DHE. In [14], it is proven that
mercurial vector commitments can be instantiated from (non-hiding) vector commitments
and trapdoor mercurial commitments. The constructions of vector commitments from the
RSA and CDH assumptions given in [14] lead to ZKS with short proofs from standard
assumptions.
In [23], a construction for zero-knowledge lists (ZKL) is proposed, where a list
is defined as an ordered set. The construction in [23] uses a ZKS and homomorphic
commitments as building blocks.
In most of the above-mentioned constructions, the data structure is not updatable.
Updatable ZKDB were first proposed in [36]. In [14], a construction for updatable
ZKDB based on updatable vector commitments and trapdoor mercurial commitments is
proposed.
There are several differences between our committed database and previous work.
First, our committed database is updatable, which was only considered in [36, 14].
Second, our committed database is oblivious. P proves in zero-knowledge that a pair of
commitments commit to a position and value that are stored in the database. In contrast,
in previous constructions, P reveals a position and a value along with a proof that the
position and the value are stored in the database. The obliviousness property allows
our committed database to be used as building block in applications that protect the
privacy of the P , because P could choose to open the commitments, but could also prove
statements in zero-knowledge about the committed position and value without revealing
them.
From a definitional point of view, security definitions given in previous works are
not in the UC model and a mechanism to integrate modularly ZKS or ZKDB as building
blocks of other protocols is not given. Our functionality for a committed database allows
the security analysis of ZK data structures in a composable framework, which will
facilitate the modular design and analysis of protocols that use them as a building block.
Another key difference between our definition and construction and the definitions
and constructions in the above-mentioned works is that we do not require the size of the
database to be hidden. In fact, our construction reveals an upper bound of the database
size that could be similar to the actual size of the committed database. Thanks to this
relaxation, we can offer a construction for a committed database that is more efficient
than the above constructions for ZKS or ZKDB. Instead of using a variant of a Merkle
tree, in our construction, a single vector commitment is used to commit to the database.
This leads to more efficient proofs and updates. This relaxation of the zero-knowledge
property is not relevant for our applications for a committed database. In this respect, our
construction for a committed database is similar to the constructions for “nearly” ZKS
and ZKDB given in [28]. In [28], ZKS and ZKDB that do not hide the size of the set or
database are provided based on polynomial commitments. However, this “nearly” ZKS
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and ZKDB constructions based on the SDH assumption are not updatable and, moreover,
extending them with efficient updates is not possible (see discussion on the paragraph
about vector commitments). In fact, as pointed out in [18], when hiding the size of the
database is required, for any construction that uses a non-interactive commitment phase
(as is the case in the ZKS and ZKDB constructions cited above), black-box extraction
of the database by the simulator in the security proof is not possible. In [18], a secure
committed database where the database size is hidden is defined in the UC model, and a
construction that uses an interactive commitment phase is proposed. As a consequence
of needing to hide the database size, the construction in [18] is also less efficient than
ours. Also, their ideal functionality does not facilitate modular design, and it outputs
position-value pairs instead of commitments to a position and to a value, which hinders
its use as building block in protocols that need to protect the privacy of the prover.
Zero-Knowledge Authenticated Data Structures. Authenticated data structures (ADS)
are a three-party protocol between a trusted owner, a trusted client and a server [45].
The owner uploads data to the server. The server receives queries from the client and
answers them. A secure ADS protects data authenticity for the client when the server is
adversarial.
Zero-knowledge ADS (ZKADS) provide privacy in addition to authenticity, i.e., the
client does not learn anything about the data structure besides what can be inferred from
the answers to the queries. The data owner is trusted. Most constructions for ZKADS do
not allow the data owner to perform updates (see [23] and references therein). Recently,
an updatable ZKADS for sets with proofs of membership [42], and an updatable ZKADS
for lists, trees and partially-ordered sets of bounded dimension [21] were proposed.
Our committed database differs from ZKADS in that the prover is not split up
into a trusted data owner and a server. Additionally, to our knowledge, security for
ZKADS has not been defined in the UC framework. Also existing constructions are not
oblivious. They reveal to clients the answers to queries in the clear, instead of revealing
commitments to the answers, which hinders their use in privacy-preserving applications.
ZK proofs for large datasets. Applications of a committed database usually involve large
amounts of data to be stored. Therefore, it is essential that the efficiency of protocols for
reading and writing into the database be sub-linear in the database size. We recall that
one of our requirements is to hide from the verifier the positions read from or written
into the database. Depending on the technique used to maintain a database, the witness
to compute a zero-knowledge proof for reading or writing could include all the values
in the database and not just the value read or written, i.e., the size of the witness could
grow with the size of the database.
Most techniques for zero-knowledge proofs are unsuitable in our case because
their computation and communication cost grows linearly with the size of the witness
w. However, some techniques exist that incur cost sub-linear in |w| and that thus are
appealing for computing zero-knowledge proofs about large datasets. In the following,
we discuss these techniques and we show that our protocol for a committed database
based on vector commitments outperforms them. We consider a prover that possesses a
large dataset of size |M | and that wishes to prove to a verifier that there is an element in
M that fulfills some statement without revealing the position of the element.
58
– Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCP) [29]. PCPs techniques produce proofs
that can be verified with cost sublinear (logarithmic) in |M |. However, the cost
for the prover is linear in |M |. Additionally, if the prover wishes to prove several
statements about M , the cost is linear in |M | for each proof.
– Succint Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (SNARK) [20]. SNARKs pro-
duce arguments that can be verified with cost independent of |M |. However, the cost
for the prover is still linear in |M | for each statement proven about M . Additionally,
SNARKs use non-black-box knowledge extraction and thus cannot be used straight-
forwardly in the UC framework.
– Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Oblivious RAM programs [38, 26]. Zero-knowledge
proofs for relations described as ORAM programs involve an initialization phase
in which the prover commits to M . In [38], the cost for the prover is linear in |M |,
whereas the cost for the verifier is independent of |M |. After the initialization phase,
many proofs can be computed about M whose cost is sublinear (proportional to the
runtime of the ORAM program) both for the prover and for the verifier. The protocol
in [38] uses a non-programmable random oracle, which is key for achieving constant
cost for the verifier in the initialization phase. Any protocol in the standard model
would involve communication cost linear in M to allow knowledge extraction.
To compare our protocol with [38], we consider that the prover first writes M into
Tblcd, and after that reads values in M from Tblcd. The cost of writing M into Tblcd
is linear in |M | for both prover and verifier. However, after that the cost of each read
operation is independent of |M | for both prover and verifier. The reason is that zero-
knowledge proofs about one vector component can be computed with cost independent
of the size of the vector. There are several constructions of vector commitments, whose
security is based on assumptions such as CDH, RSA or DHE. In Section F, we recall a
construction based on DHE that leads to practical zero-knowledge protocols for reading
from and writing into the vector commitment of cost independent of the size |M | of the
committed vector.
Our protocol provides thus better asymptotic amortized cost than the state of the
art protocol in [38]. (In the initialization phase, the cost for the verifier is linear in |M |
which is unavoidable when aiming for security in the standard CRS-hybrid model.) We
note that [38] does not provide a concrete instantiation or efficiency analysis of their
protocol, so we do not compare it with the instantiation of our protocol in Section F.
Additionally, vector commitments allow for an easy way to prove statements about
the position read or written. To achieve the same in the protocol in [38], one would need
to include a “position” field in each element of M to be able to prove a statement about
the position.
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